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ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the cost-production relationship 
of trap and hand line fishing in Puerto Rico. A model of 
the fishing family firm is designed which is similar to 
the traditional neo-classical model of the fishing indus-
try. The catch functions, of the Cobb-Douglas type, are 
estimated using the single least squares methods. Tests 
of technical efficiency and tests of price efficiency are 
then conducted to establish if some groups of fishermen 
are more efficient than others and to verify if the fish-
ermen maximize their profit, given the technical coeffi-
cients of the catch function and the level of the prices. 
The results of those tests show that some fishermen 
are significantly more skillful than others. They also 
indicate that, as a rule the fishermen do not maximize 
their profit, that is, that they do not choose the optimum 
combination of inputs. 
Those conclusions suggest a certain number of policy 
measures. It is shown that improving the fishermen's skill 
would substantially increase their catch. The same results 
would be obtained if, with proper advice, they selected the 
optimum combination of inputs. 
Given the lack of sufficient data on the fish popu-
lation it was not possible to measure the precise extent 
of the effects of those policy measures. However this 
study provides a useful guide for the policy makers. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
This study is a cost-production analysis of the two 
most important methods of catching fish in the artisanal 
fishery of Puerto Rico, namely, hand line fishing and trap 
fishing. The estimation of costs and of returns, in addi-
tion to the description of the economic behavior of the 
fishermen, will lead to suggesting policy orientations. 
For many years Puerto Rico has been importing most 
of its food products including fish. 1 Recently, efforts 
have been undertaken to reduce this dependency on outside 
suppliers. In this context the Puerto Rican Department 
of Agriculture has initiated various programs 2 to help 
the artisanal fisherman. 
This study provides the decision makers with infor-
mation, not otherwise available, concerning the producti-
vity of some fishing methods as well as the economic 
behavior of the fishermen. It shows what can be expected 
from a change in the input combinations presently adopted 
l 
Harvey S. Perloff, Puerto Rico's Economic Future, (The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1950), 
PP. 314-316. 
2 Rafa~l Pico, Nueva Geografia de Puerto Rico, (Editorial 
Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1969). 
l 
2 
~y the fishermen as well as some of the effects which 
could result from improving their fishing skills. These 
are tools which will help design the policies necessary 
to imorove the economic situation of the fishermen and 
to develop the artisanal fishery. 
Several approaches were considered. For the purpose 
of policy makinq, a dynamic model would have probably 
been more appropriate. However, insufficient data were 
available on the fish population. In addition, it would 
have been very difficult to obtain information on the 
levels of input usea by fishermen for more than one or two 
years. For several inputs the direct interviews were the 
only source of data, and, in many occasions, the fishermen 
had difficulties remembering their past investments. 
Finally, the statistics gathered by the Puerto Rican Depart-
ment of Agriculture were reliable only after 1969, limiting 
possible use of a time series. For those reasons, it was 
decided to use a static model despite the limitations of 
such a framework. 
The cost-production analysis was conducted for 1972. 
From the economic performance and behavior revealed by 
this study it was possible to deduce some policy sugges-
tions. Because of the framework chosen here the effects 
Of those oolicies co11ld not be measured with precision 
and it needs to be emnhasized that the results of this part 
Of the study should be interpreted with circumsoection. 
3 
The present chapter gives a description of trap and 
hand line fishing in Puerto Rico , showing in Secion I 
the importance of the artisan fishery. In Section II the 
attention is more specifically directed toward trap and 
hand line fishing. Finally, Section III summarizes the 
various steps of the cost-production analysis. 
4 
I The Artisan Fishery in Puerto Rico 
I The economic setting 
The artisan fishery represents only a small part of 
the Puerto Rican economy. Yet it is responsible for the 
entirety of the local catch. There is also a tuna fishing 
industry, operating mainly out of Mayaguez , but owned by 
continental Americans and Japanese. The tuna is canned in 
Puerto Rico and exported to other markets. These two 
sectors of the Puerto Rican fishery are totally indepen-
dent and to date there are no fishing operations of an 
intermediate size between the tuna industry and artisanal 
fishery. Table I-1 compares the artisanal fishery indus-
try with the total economy and the agricultural sector. 
As shown in Table I-1 the artisanal fishery employs only 
a small amount of the total labor force, and it produces 
an even smaller part of the Island income. 
The local fishery is one of the less developed sectors 
of the economy. Using the aggregate figures of Table I-1 
it is possible to roughly compare the average productivi-
ties of labor. In the total economy it is around $6200 
(column I divided by column 4). In agriculture it is slight-
ly over $3200 while in the fishery it is only about $2000. 
The actual difference is even larger since for the fisheries 
gross income is used instead of net income. For the United 
TABLE I-1 
INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUERTO RICAN ECONOMY 
AND IN THE ARTISANAL FISHERY 
Employment 
National 
Income ( 1) 
Net Income 
from Agric. ( 2) 
Gross Value of Total 
the Catch (4) Economy (2) Agric. (2) 
(in thousands of dollars) (in thousands) 
1970 3,848,000 184,000 1,597 738 74 
1971 4,296,000 196,000 1,789 755 66 
1972 4,824,000 211,000 1,930 783 62 
Artis anal 
Fishery(3) 
1 
1 
1 
Sources: (1) Department of the Treasury. A Publication of the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico Economy and Finances Puerto Rico, 1972, p. 6. 
( 2) Ibid. , p. 7. 
U1 
(3) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Agriculture, Status of 
Fisheries in Puerto Rico, 1972, by Jose A. Suarez Caabro, Agricultural 
and Fisheries Contributions, Vol. V, No. 3, Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, 
p. 47. 
(4) Ibid., p. 48. 
6 
states as a whole, the same computations give respecti-
vely: $6400 for the total economy, $5500 for agriculture 
and $4600 for the fisheries. 3 These are only aggregate 
figures and one should be careful when deriving conclu-
sions, yet they emphasize the need to improve the pro-
ductivity of the Puerto Rican agriculture and especially 
that of the fisheries. 
At the same time, there is in Puerto Rico an impor-
tant demand for fish and shellfish and the local catch 
represents only 5% of the total consumption. 4 In an 
effort to develop the artisanal fishery the government 
of the Commonwealth has instituted various loan and cre-
dit programs to provide capital for the fishermen. 5 
Some of these programs have been operating for more 
than ten years. Still, much remains to be done to improve 
the fishing methods and the commercialization of the catch. 
3F. igures computed from U.S. Bureau of the Census Statis-
Tical Abstract of the United States, 1972 (93rd Edition) 
Washington, D.C., 1972. 
4 
Puerto Rico and the Sea, An Action Program for Marine 
Atfairs (Preprint) A Report to the Governor, San-Juan, 
1972, p. 57. 
5 
Rafael Pico, Nueva Geografia de Puerto Rico . 
7 
II The cultural context 
Two monographs on Puerto Rican fishing communities 
are apparently the only sociological studies of the arti-
sanal fishery. One 6 deals with four fishing villages in 
southwest Puerto Rico. The other7 is based on a survey of 
a single village, and includes more interesting detail. 
The studies indicate that, as compared with other popula-
tion groups, the average fisherman had larger families, 
was older, and had fewer years of schooling. 8 These 
characteristics suggest a traditional society in which 
custom and social inertia influence the fishermen's 
economic decisions. The more detailed study 9 confirms 
the general impression, but suggests a growing hetero-
geneity among the group, with more and more fishing family 
firms becoming integrated with the market economy. 
6Federico G. Blay, A Study of the Relevance of Selected 
Ecological Factors Related to Water Resources and the 
Social Organization of Fishing Villages in Puerto Rico. 
(Water Resources Research Institute, University of Puerto 
Rico, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, 1972). 
7Irving A. Spaulding, Puerto Rico Fisheries and Mariculture 
Development Project (Unpublished Inter Agency Report, 
University of Rhode Island, 1974). 
8 Blay, The Social Organization of Fishing Villages in 
Puerto Rico. 
9
spaulding, Puerto Rico Fisheries and Mariculture 
Development Project. 
8 
The incomes of the fishermen reflect this to some 
extent. Ninety-one percent of the fishermen, and 55 per-
cent of the non-fishermen have annual incomes in the $1000 -
$3999 range, while 30 percent of the fishermen and 27.3 
percent of the others have incomes between $4000 - $5999. 
This suggeststhat a few fishermen are earning fairly good 
incomes. At the same time none of the fishermen, but 18.2 
percent of the non-fishermen, have incomes less than $1000. 
The traditional character of the fishery is also re-
vealed by the fact that "in general, the part-time fisher-
men and the non-fishermen· showed a somewhat more prevalent 
tendency than did the full-time fishermen for continuing 
to work at a different job if their current occupation 
could no longer be followed (in that situation) 47.8 per-
cent of the full-time fishermen and 41.7 percent of the non-
10 fishermen indicated that they would not work". This is 
further emphasized by the fishermen's justifications for 
not working if they could not fish any longer. Forty-two 
point seven percent indicated that they knew nothing else, 
while only 22.2 percent of the non-fishermen justified their 
a . h. 11 nswer in t is way. 
lO_Ibid., p. 16 
11Ibid 
. ' Table lSb . 
9 
From those observations it appears that the artisanal 
fishery in Puerto Rico is still largely traditional, and 
that most of the fishermen are not fully integrated into 
the market economy. 
While some fishermen are modernizing their operations 
and introducing new techniques of fishing or of management, 
most of them are still attached to the traditional methods. 
10 
II Trap and Hand Line Fishing 
As shown in Table I-2, together, trap and hand line 
fishing are responsible for nearly 60 percent of the total 
landings. Hand line fishing is practiced all around the 
island, while trap fishing is more concentrated in some 
areas. Of the 8,105 traps reported in 1972, 3,160 (39 per-
cent) cou ld be found on the West Coast while only 224 (2.8 
percent) belonged to fishermen on the North Coast. 12 
In Puerto Rico the most common fish trap is the 
arrow-head typP.. They are made of chicken wire around a 
frame of either mangrove wood or iron rods. "Normally, it 
is fished in shallower depth (less than twenty fathoms) be-
cause of the lack of mechanical hauling equipment'~. 13 
In addition, the boats have no navigation equipment to aid 
the captain in finding his traps. Land marks are used 
which_is very inefficient as soon as it is misty or foggy. 
On fishing grounds known for their high productivity there 
12 Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture, 
Status o f Fisheries in Puerto Rico, 1972 by Jose A. 
Suarez Caabro, Agricultural and Fisheries Contributions, 
Vol. V, No . 3, Caba Rojo, Puerto Rico, p. 47. 
13 
Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico Departamento 
de Agricultura, A Report of Exploratory Fishing and 
Gear Tests in Puerto Rico from 1969 to 1972 by Rolf 
Suhl Contribuciones Agropecuarias y Pesqueras Vol. IV, 
No. 3, Caba Rojo Puerto Rico , p. 5. 
11 
TABLI: I-2 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CATCH OF FISH AND SHELLFISH 
BY FISHING GEAR IN PUERTO RICO IN 1972 
GEAR PERCI:NT 
(of the total 
Fish Pot 41 
Spiny Lobster Pot less than 1 
Beach Seine 11 
Gill Net 8 
Hand Line 17 
Troll Line 11 
Spear 2 
Trot Line 1 
By Hand 8 
Cast Net less than 1 
catch) 
Source: Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, Departamento 
de Agricultura, A Report on Fisheries Statistics 
Program in Puerto Rico from 1967 to 1972, by Rolf 
Juhl and Jose A. Suarez Caabro Agricultural and 
Fisheries Contributions, Vol. IV, No. 4, San Juan 
Puerto Rico, p. 22. 
12 
are often a very large number of traps and sometimes it is 
necessary to navigate carefully to avoid cutting the ropes 
tying the buoys to the traps. Generally, the fish pots 
are not deliberately baited but sometimes the fishermen 
will leave inside some fish which are too small to sell or 
for which there is no demand. 
Hand line fishing "while requiring a small investment 
requires considerable more ability and knowledge of fish 
habits 11 • 14 In this type of fishing the fishermen use long 
lines (300 to 500 feet). 
11 At the end of the line 4, 6, 8 hooks are 
hung from a hard frame of galvanized wire, 
with a three1 50 five pound lead attached to the center 11 • 
Those hooks are baited with small fish which the fishermen 
catch with their cast nets. When fishing with hand lines, 
some of the fishermen will let the boat~ drift once they 
are on the fishing grounds. Others prefer to keep the boat 
still, and in some areas there will be one man in the boat 
whose sole task is to steer the boat while the others are 
fishing. 
14 
Study of the Fisheries Potential of the Virgin Islands, 
Special Report, Caribbean Research Institute Contribution, 
No . 1 Virgin Island Ecological Research Station, August, 
1969, p. 41. 
15 
Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico Departamento de 
Agricultura Contribuciones Agropecuarias y Pesqueras, Vol. 
II, No. 1, San Juan Puerto Rico, p. 28. 
13 
In areas where conditions are suitable for trap and 
hand line fishing many fishermen practice both methods. 
There is a significant difference between the species 
c aught by traps and the species caught by lines. The 
l a r ges t s ource of revenue from traps is lobster (35.5 per-
c ent nf the total value of the catch from traps in 1971) . 16 
But, l obsters aside, the difference in the species composi-
tion of the fin-fish catch from traps and hand lines is 
i mport a nt . 
While the weight of the fish caught with traps is 60 
percent larger than the weight of the landing from lines, 
t his d i fference is reduced in value to 22 percent. (Table I-3). 
Even taking into account lobsters in 1971, the average price 
per pound of fish and shellfish caught by traps was 36¢ 
. 44¢ . 17 against for hand lines. For hand lines 50 percent of 
landing s were silk snappers which sold for more than 60¢ a 
pound. Still, trap fishing is more common probably for 
the reasons mentioned earlier regarding the ability and 
knowl e dge required to use hand lines effectively. 
16 
Commowealth of Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture, 
Status of Fisheries in Puerto Rico, 1971 by Rolf Juhl and 
J~se A. Suarez Caabro Agricultural and Fisheries Contribu-
tions, Vol . IV, No. 1 San Juan Puerto Rico, p. 45. 
17 . ~-, pp. 45-46. 
TABLE I-3 
COMPARISON OF THE CATCH COMPOSITION FROM TRAPS 
AND HAND LINES IN 1971 
Tra,es Hand Lines 
Quantity % of Value % of I Quantity % of Value % of (lbs) Total $ Total Total $ Total 
Grunt 300,000 26.3 70,091 19 8,300 1. 2 2,324 . 7 
Grouper 212,400 18.7 68,404 18.6 100,000 14.5 53,000 10.9 
Silk Snapper 100,316 8.8 61,357 16.6 230,084 33.3 151,462 50. 
All Snapper 182,122 16 107,857 29.3 223,323 32.3 228,329 75.4 
(including 
silk snapper) I 
Porgy I 80,000 11. 6 19,849 6.6 
Goat Fish 206,200 18.l 50,357 13.7 
Total Fish 1,138,170 100 368,118 100 I 691,497 303,366 100 
Caught 
Source: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Agriculture, Status of Fisheries 
in Puerto Rico, 1971 by Rolf Juhl and Jose A. Suarez Caabro, Agricultural 
t-' 
.i:.. 
and Fisheries Contributions, Vol. IV, No. 1, San Juan, Puerto Rico, pp. 45-46. 
15 
The different composition of the catches can be partly 
explained by the behavior and in particular the feeding 
habits of the various species. The traps catch bottom 
feeders such as grunts which, when they are young "feed 
primarily on the animals of the plankton within a few feet 
of the bottom. These food habits are retained to a large 
degree by the adults (of some species) 11 • 18 
A similar explanation applies to the goatfish which 
"live in close association with sand or mud bottoms ... 
The food consists primarily of a great variety of small 
invertebrate animals, many of which normally live beneath 
the surface of the sand or mud 11 • 19 
In contrast porgies "do not seek shelter in reefs but 
rely on keeping a considerable distance between themselves 
20 
and a potential source of danger". This explains why they 
are not found in the fish traps. 
As for the silk snappers, the majority are caught with 
hand lines because they are "a deeper-water species than 
most, (it is often found between) 21 300 and 800 feet". 
18c . 
aribbean Reef Fishes, John E. Randall (Jersey City: 
T.F . H. Publications, Inc., 1968), p. 128. 
19Ib' ~-' p. 153. 
20 . ~-' p. 141. 
21 . 
B Fishes of the Bahamas and Adjacent Tropical Waters, 
Ohlke and Chaplin (Wynnewood: Livingston Publishing 
Company, 1968), p. 351. 
16 
III The Different Steps of the Analysis 
Chapter II provides a detailed description of the 
areas surveyed. Each of the communities visited are des-
cribed, and their degree of representativeness of the 
various coasts is discussed. In addition the composi-
tion of the sample is presented here and some characte-
ristics of the group of fishermen interviewed are ex-
plained. 
Chapter III reviews the latest neo-classical models 
of the fishing industry but earlier articles are of ten 
mentioned for their contributions. Although the models 
often dealt with the industry, it was possible to use 
their approach to analyze the firm's behavior. It was also 
necessary, however to refer to more practical works where 
catch functions had been estimated for various fisheries. 
They provided examples of the variables which were most 
often chosen to explain the catch, as well as various means 
to measure some of these inputs. 
The econometric problems raised by the estimation of 
the catch function also needed to be examined. A long 
. 22 
series of articles, starting with Marschak and Andrew's 
22 
.Jacob Marschak and William H. Andrews, Jr., "Random 
Simultaneous Equations and the Theory of Production," 
Econometrica, 12 (July/October, 1944). 
17 
offered various ways of estimating production functions 
in general. Furthermore, they emphasized some properties 
of those various approaches, which could be used to measure 
management. 
In addition to reviewing articles on the economics 
of the fishing industry, Chapter III surveys the more 
technical works where catch functions were estimated and 
the articles dealing with econometric problems inherent 
to this kind of study. 
The theoretical model is displayed in Chapter IV. 
The latest developments of the nee-classical model on the 
fishing industry are introduced to devise a framework 
suitable to analyze trap fishing and hand line fishing. 
Perfect competition is assumed throughout the study. 
A method is proposed to estimate the catch function 
and to conduct various statistical tests concerning the 
economic behavior of the fishermen, particularly to see 
if profit is maximized. 
The synthesis of the various levels of research 
undertaken up to then starts with Chapter V. The the-
oretical model and the data gathered in Puerto Rico are 
combined to estimate catch functions. The need to con-
ciliate the logic of the model and the limits imposed 
by the data collected led to computing many regressions. 
18 
several measures of the same variables WP.re often availa-
ble but due to the practical difficulties of estimating 
them, a priori, none could be preferred. Chapter V 
exposes the advantages and drawbacks for the various va-
riables and it shows the regressions obtained when using 
those different measures. In some cases the low signi-
ficance of the regressions (R2 ) leads to rejecting some 
of the possibilities. However, the quality of the va-
rious regressions is very often, quite comparable and 
several of them can be regarded as very satisfactory. 
This makes it possible to avoid a choice between those 
equations in the subsequent chapters some of which will 
be more useful according to the type of analysis conducted. 
Chapter V only describes the catch function. Chapter 
VI analyzes the behavior of the fishermen in more detail. 
To test for differences in technical efficiency among 
groups of fishermen, other regressions are computed. Assu-
ming that all the groups of fishermen have the same catch 
function, except for the possibility of different technical 
efficiencies, a dummy variable is introduced to account for 
this effect. When the coefficient of this variable is signi-
ficantly different from zero the groups do not have the same 
technical efficiency. 
19 
Tests were then conducted to see if the fishermen 
are price efficient, that is, if they choose the optimum 
combination of inputs given the set of input and output 
prices. This test is first conducted for all the trap 
fishermen as one group and for all the line fishermen as 
another. Later on, sub-groups are defined, using the same 
criteria as the ones already selected when dividing the 
fishermen to test for technical efficiency. The tests 
of price efficiency are conducted again, this time to see 
if there are differences in the price efficiencies of the 
various sub-groups. 
The various findings concerning technical and price 
efficiencies lead, in Chapter VII, to propose some policy 
orientations which could be chosen to improve the profits 
of the fishermen. However, before making those suggestions, 
and in order to be able to compare the possible effects of 
those policies to the present situation, some time is de-
voted to present some of the economic performances of the 
fishermen. Since the chapters have analyzed their behavior, 
it is now possible to show the results of those practices 
and to compare them to what may happen if they are changed. 
The limitations of the comparative static framework are 
recalled and emphasized. Given those warnings, the direct-
ion of changes to be expected from several possible policy 
measures are analyzed. 
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A conclusion summarizes the various results. It 
emphasizes the need for futher research and suggests some 
avenues which should be explored. 
II THE PUERTO RICAN FISHING GROUNDS 
AND THE AREAS SURVEYED 
One of the reasons explaining the relatively low 
development of the Puerto Rican fisheries is the limited 
number of productive banks around the island. 
In this chapter the Island's coast is divided into 
four areas which are descr ibed successively. In addition, 
more specific details are presented for the communities 
surveyed on each of the coasts. 
In order to be able to generalize the results of the 
study to the whole Island, a survey was conducted in six 
municipalities chosen for their representativeness for 
trap or hand line fishing or both. Of those six munici-
palities, one, Arecibo, is situated on the North Coast; two, 
Aguadilla and Cabo Rojo are on the West Coast; two others, 
Guanica and Salinas are on the South Coast; and one, 
Naguabo, is on the East Coast. Before describing those 
municipalities it must be noted that in the municipality 
Of Cabo Rojo, six fishing villages were surveyed, while in 
each of the other municipalities only one fishing community 
Was included in the study. Differences between the six 
villages of Cabo Rojo suggested that important additional 
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information would be obtained by studying all of them, 
while in each of the other municipalities the various 
fishing communities were quite similar. 
The representativeness of the sample is suggested 
by the figures in Table II-1. In 1972, the fish caught 
in the six municipalities represented 51 percent of the 
total value landed in Puerto Rico. In addition, 35 per-
cent of the R:terto Rican fishermen lived in those six 
areas. 
The number of personal interviews conducted in each 
of the municipalities is shown in Table II-2. 
23 
TABLE II-1 
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PORTS SURVEYED 
AND COMPARISON WITH THE REST OF THE ISLAND. 
Quantity Value 
landed lbs. landed $ 
( 1) (2 ) 
North Coast 
Arecibo 
West Coast 
Cabo Rojo 
Aguadilla 
South Coast 
Salinas 
Guanica 
East Coast 
Naguabo 
301,100 
42,429 
1,627,799 
1,111,322 
322,145 
431,279 
106,830 
137,201 
1,321,290 
311,334 
170,842 
30,179 
624,763 
402,090 
114,922 
214,145 
61,965 
63,586 
564(034 
133,512 
Island Totals 3,681,468 1,573,784 
Total in areas 
surveyed 2,031,261 
% of the island 55% 
806,254 
51 % 
Fishermen No. of No .of No .of 
Boats Traps Lines 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
292 
42 
27 5 
111 
69 
245 
48 
47 
156 
19 
968 
336 
35% 
198 
32 
247 
93 
58 
211 
38 
39 
141 
17 
797 
277 
35% 
224 
12 
3160 
2649 
102 
2464 
499 
296 
2257 
343 
289 
96 
219 
44 
112 
117 
12 
18 
137 
14 
8105 762 
3901 296 
48% 39% 
Source: Columns (1) to (5): Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
Department of Agriculture. Status of Fisheries in 
Puerto Rico, 1972 by Jose A. Suarez-Caabro. Agri-
cultural and Fisheries Contributions Vol. V No. 3 
Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico p. 47. 
Column (6} Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico. 
Departmento de Agricultura Contribuciones Agrope-
cuarias y Pesqueras. Vol II, No. 1. San Juan, 
Puerto Rico. p.27. 
Cabo Rojo 
Aguadilla 
l\.recibo 
Naguabo 
Salina 
Guanica 
Total 
TABLE II-2 
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS PER MUNICIPALITY 
Intended 
Sample size 
41 
8 
11 
9 
10 
11 
80 
IN 1973-74 
Men not 
fishing 
anymore 
6 
l 
2 
4 
4 
2 
19 
Refused 
to 
answer 
1 
l 
2 
Actual number 
of 
responses 
14* 
7 
8 
5 
6 
9 
50 
*In addition 17 had no sale tickets and 3 did not fish with lines nor traps. 
N 
~ 
EL 
Source : 
MAP II-1 
PUERTO RICO: THE MUNICIPALITIES SURVEYED 
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r General Characteristics 
considering that the richest marine life develops in 
waters less than 100 fathoms deep, it is significant to 
note that on the North Coast the 100 fathom limit is no 
more than one or two miles from the shore. This explains 
why along that coast there is little fishing and that 
very few fishermen there use fish traps. Instead they 
use various kinds of lines, mainly hand lines and troll 
lines. In addition, the weather is often rough and the 
currents are strong making it difficult for the fishermen 
to go out often. Finally the coast line offers few pro-
tected areas which could be used as harbours. In many 
places the cliffs are high and it is often difficult to 
reach the sea. For all those reasons, 
1 
"This area only produced 8% of the total 
landings, ... In 1972, 301,000 pounds of 
fish and shellfish were taken in the north 
coast. The average ex-vessel price per 
pound was $.56. This was the lowest fish 
production of the island and conversely, 
it was the area whe2e the highest price 
,,;as paid for fish". 
Much of the information concerning the geographical 
characteristics of the various areas and derived from 
Ra~ael ~ico, Nueval Geografia du Puerto Rico (Editorial 
Universitaria. Universidad de Puerto Rico , 1969). 
2 
c::-Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Agriculture, 
~tatus of Fisheries in Puerto Rico, 1972, by Jose A. 
Vu~res-caabro, Agricultural and Fisheries Contributions, 
0 
• V, No. 3, Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, p. 37. 
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This last remark can be explained to a large extent by the 
high proportion in the catch of fish with a high price per 
pound (Snappers) rather than by different market charac-
teristics. 3 Finally, it should be noted that during a 
large part of the year when the sea conditions do not allow 
fishing trips many fishermen frequently use haul seines at 
the mouth of the rivers. 
The municipality chosento represent the North Coast 
was Arecibo. 
II Arecibo 
Most of the fishermen live in barrios outside of this 
large to~n. As with most of the fishermen on the North 
Coast their most common fishing technique is hand line 
fishing. For this they use boats which are between 16 and 
18 feet with motors between 16 and 20 horsepowers. 
3 
Ibid 
----..;.•t p. 13 
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II The West Coast 
I General Characteristics 
The characteristics of part of the west coast are 
similar to those of the north coast. To the north of 
Anasco the continental shelf is also very narrow and 
consequently few fishermen use fish traps in that area. 
They use hand lines and, particularly in Aguadilla, they 
also have troll lines with which they catch tuna. 
To the south of Mayaguez the continental shelf is 
wider, the 100 fathom line going as far as 17 miles 
from the shore. Here are found some of the riches 
fishing grounds in Puerto Rico . Various types of gear 
are used by the fishermen and some of the most successful 
fishermen, by Puerto Rican standards, fish off the south-
ern part of the west coast. Puerto Real , in Cabo Rojo, is 
the most important fishing port of the island. One should 
also mention the presence of large mangrove areas in and 
around the bay of Boqueron (Cabo Rojo) where the fishermen 
catch mangrove oysters. In fact, Boqueron is the largest 
center for the production of oysters in Puerto Rico. 
"The west coast produced 44% of the 
landings in 1972 ... A total of 1,628,000 
pounds of fish and shellfish were landed 
with an average ex-vessel price per pound 
of $.39. This was th~ lowest recorded 
price on the island". 
4 . ~-, p. 39. 
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There too, the composition of the catch is largely 
responsible for the low price of the fish. Using traps 
the fishermen catch a lot of low priced goatfish. 
Two municipalities were surveyed on this coast, 
Cabo Rojo and Aguadilla. 
II Cabo Rojo 
Cabo Rojo is situated at the south western end of 
the island. Because of the wide continental shelf and 
the numerous bays it is a region very favorable to the 
fishing industry. Six communities of the fishermen are 
found in that municipality: Puerto Real, El Combate, 
Bahia Sucia, Boqueron, Joyuda, and Guanajibo: Interviews 
were conducted with a number of fishermen in each of 
those communities. 
Puerto Real is the most important fishing port in 
Puerto Rico. Most of the boats used here are 28 to 32 
feet long with inboard engines and a sail, and the majo-
rity are equipped with mechanical pot haulers. The 
fishermen primarily fish with traps and hand lines al-
though a few own or use other kinds of fishing gear. 
With their large boats many fishermen are able to go 
far off shore and take advantage of the wide continental 
shelf. Some even fish off Mona Island which is 50 miles 
to the southwest of Mayaguez. In that case they often 
leave for a week and establish a base on the island from 
Which they go fishing every day. 
TABLE II-3 
NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS IN EACH COMMUNITY 
OF CABO ROJO 
Men Men Men not Actual 
Intended not without Refused fishing Number 
Sample fishing sale to with traps of 
Size anymore tickets answer or lines responses 
Puerto Real 12 2 5 5 
w 
0 
El Combate 12 2 4 2 4 
Bahia Sucia 10 2 5 3 
Boqueron 3 2 1 
Joyuda 2 1 1 
Guanajibo 2 1 1 
Total 41 6 17 1 3 14 
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In Puerto Real there are three dealers who buy t h e 
fish from the fis he rmen. These dealers play an important 
role in the economic life of the community. In addition 
to buying the fish, t hey also provide gas and ice to the 
fishermen and at leas t one of them owns several boats 
for which he hires captains. As part of the contract 
the captains fishing on the dealer's boats receive a lower 
price per pound for the fish caught. Although this situa-
tion is not unique to Puerto Real it is quite rare in the 
other fishing ports. 
There are few other economic activities in Puerto 
Real besides fishing. There are a small number of tourists 
and some fishermen combine their fishing activities with 
providing boat rides particularly to Mona Island. 
In El Combate one finds this same combination of 
fishing and tourism, although the latter activity is more 
important here than in Puerto Real. The fishermen of El 
Cornbate can be divided in two groups according to the 
size of their operation. Some have large and powerful 
boats as in Puerto Real. Those men fish mainly with traps 
and hand lines, and their boats are often equipped with 
pot haulers. The other group owns smaller boats with less 
powerful, outboard motors. These fishermen often used 
several types of gear (various types of nets in particular) 
besides the fish pots and hand lines. 
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In El Combate, too, the fish is sold to dealers none 
of whom seem to have the economic power of the dealers 
of Puerto Real. 
Bahia Sucia is situated on the southern coast but 
it is still in the municipality of Cabo Rojo. Fishing 
is the most important activity in this village. Here 
the boats are smaller than in Puerto Real or El Combate 
(12 to 16 feet). This village presents the largest diver-
sity of gears used; every kind of net or line used in 
Puerto Rico can be found in Bahia Sucia. Still, trap 
fishing is the most common method. Since April 1973 
fishing activity has been hampered by an oil spill off 
the coast. One of the consequences of this accident was 
the formation of an association of the fishermen initially 
for the sole purpose of representing their interests, but 
which is now providing other services including marketing 
of practically the whole catch of Bahia Sucia. 
Boqueron is situated between Puerto Real and El 
Cornbate. Tourism is one of the main economic resources 
here, but there is also some fishing, especially for 
mangrove oysters. Few fishermen of Boqueron use traps 
or lines and most do not catch anything besides oysters. 
Guanajibo and Joyuda are two small villages to the 
south of Mayaguez. Few fishermen were reported in either 
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of these two places. The fishermen surveyed in Guanajibo 
were operating large boats as in Puerto Real and also 
fishing with both traps and hand lines. In Joyuda, on 
the contrary, most fishermen have smaller boats, much like 
those in Bahia Sucia and fish primarily with traps. 
Some general patterns can be isolated for Cabo Rojo 
as a whole. There are two classes of fishermen, some with 
big boats, others with small boats, but whatever the size 
of their boats in all the villages, the fishermen favor 
fishing with traps. In addition, some fish with hand lines, 
and, most of the time, whether they own other types of gear 
or not, trap fishing and hand line fishing are their most 
important sources of landings. 
II Aguadilla 
Aguadilla is situated in a bay, on the west coast 
to the north of Mayaguez. In that area the continental 
shelf does not extend very far and consequently there is 
little trap fishing out of Aguadilla. The fishermen main-
ly use lines: troll lines and hand lines. Usually their 
boats are between 16 and 18 feet but since the waves are 
bigger here than in the south the bottom of the boat is 
curved from front to back. This type of boat, which or-
ginated here but which is also used all along the north 
coast, is referred to as the "yola J>.guadilla." 
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The motors are often powerful for this size of: boat; 
20 to 25 horsepower is not uncommon. The fishermen say 
that they need such motors because of the type of fishing 
they do (troll lines) and because of the rough weather. 
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III The South Coast 
I General Characteristics 
Along the south coast the continental shelf is not 
very wide except from Guayama to Ponce. Yet, almost 
everywhere, it is large enough so that the fishermen can 
practice trap fishing along with line fishing . One of 
the problems facing the fishing industry along the south 
coast is the competition with other industries for the 
use of the shore line. This is particularly so around Ponce 
and Guanica where there are refineries and chemical plants. 
Besides being a potential source of pollution, these indus-
tries are responsible for much of the maritime traffic along 
the south coast. At times, this creates a problem for the 
fishermen who lose their traps because the buoy lines are 
cut by the merchant ships. 
"In 1972, 431,000 pounds of fish and shellfish 
were landed (on the south coast). T§e average 
ex-vessel price per pound was $.48." 
Salinas and Guanica were surveyed as representative of the 
South Coast. 
II Salinas 
One could say of Salinas that it is the average fish-
ing port of Puerto Rico. It is a small town of the southern 
5Ib' ~., p. 37. 
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coast situated in a bay which offers good protection to the 
small boats. The continental shelf is not very wide here 
but it is sufficient to allow trap fishing. Most fishermen 
have around 40 to 50 traps. The boats are usually 16 to 18 
feet long. 
III Guanica 
Guanica was the last community surveyed. Here too 
the fishermen use traps but in fewer numbers than in the 
other ports. Most of the fishermen own only 20 or 30 
traps. The boats and motors too are usually smaller than 
in the rest of the island. This is probably related to the 
fact that most fishermen go fishing alone in their boats. 
In none of the other communities visited is this a common 
practice. 
In one of the barrios where the fishermen live, some 
condominiums and summer houses are now being built. This 
presently provides jobs to some fishermen and is a welcomed 
second source of income. However, many of the fishermen 
interviewed resent the development of tourism in that area. 
They view it as an infringement of their freedom. 
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I V The East Coast 
I General Characteristics 
Finally, the east coast is, with the west coast, 
the most favorable for fishing. Here the continental 
she l f i s very large (1500 square miles) and the depth is 
6 
never beyond 40 fathoms. The weather is usually more 
clement t han along the other coasts and, in addition, there 
are nume r ous small bays which provide natural harbours. 
Many f i s hermen who live on the main Island go fishing around 
the smaller i s lands of Vieques and Culebra. The fishermen 
of the e as t coast are practically the only ones using lobs-
ter pots. They also use many fish traps . This type of 
fishing is very well adapted to the natural conditions on 
this coast. 
"This (region) ranks second among Puerto Rico's 
f i s heries area . In 1972, a total of 1,321,000 
pounds of fish and shellfish were landed with 
an average ex-vessel price of $.43 per pound . 
Th i s area produced 36 7percent of the total land-ings of Puerto Rico". 
Naguabo was the municipality studied on the East Coast. 
II Naquabo 
Naguabo was chosen to represent the east coast. It 
6 
Rafael Pi co, Nueva Geografia de Puerto Rico, p. 145. 
7 S~ommonwealth of Puerto Rico. Department of Agriculture 
C-atus of Fi s heries in Puerto Rico 1972, by Jose A. Suarez 
Naabro Agricultural and Fisheries Contributions Vol. V, 
0
• 3_, Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, p. 39. 
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is one of the largest fishing centers on that side of 
the Island. The continental shelf extends quite far here 
and consequently trap fishing is the most common way of 
fishing. The boats are bigger (18-24 feet) and the engines 
more powerful (25-40 horsepower) than in most other places. 
The fishermen also have more traps than in many other cen-
ters; 100 to 200 traps is not uncommon. 
The traps are frequently laid all the way from 
Naguabo to the island of Culebra which is situated 20 miles 
east of Naguabo. In those cases the fishermen may go lift 
some traps, stay in Culebra overnight, and come back the 
next day while lifting more traps. Despite the fact that 
the fishermen of that area own many traps only two of them 
have mechanical pot haulers. 
In Naguabo one of the big problems faced by the fish-
ermen is the loss of traps. There is a considerable marine 
traffic around the areas where the traps are laid and often 
the ropes tying the buoys to the fish pots are cut. For 
some fishermen the number of traps lost in 1972 was close 
to half the number of the traps they keep in the water. 
Finally, in all the communities surveyed only the 
fishermen of Puerto Real and some in El Combate brought ice 
With them on the fishing trip. Usually these trips are not 
Very long, and in Arecibo some fisher~en fish at night. 
Still, there is little doubt that the quality of the fish 
Would be much improved if better care was taken of the catch. 
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VI Desc r iption of the Sample 
Tab l e II - 4 summarizes part of the information and 
g i ve s s ome indications concerning other aspects of the fish-
i ng f ami l y firms in the different communities. A word of 
c aution i s necessary when interpreting the average number of 
trap fish ing days or line fishing days. When this number is 
low it usually means that only 1 or 2 fishermen practice this 
method o f fishing. It is less often the case that many 
fisherme n will practice one method most of the year and the 
other one a few days a ye~r. 
In Table II-5 and Table II-6 the sample is divided 
into homo ge neo us subsets according to the power of the boats . 
Table II - 5 concerns the fishermen fishing with traps , 
while Table I I -6 gives the same information for those fish-
ing with l ines. 
The data show that, in general, the large boats go to 
sea more o f ten . Their annual revenue, from traps and lines 
combined, reflects this behavior. This is to be expected : 
the owners of large boats have to finance greater investments. 
This comparatively large investment is not only due to the 
boat and its motor but also to the fact that they fish more 
traps and u s e mechanical winches. 
Another important finding is that most fishermen fish 
mainly with either traps or with lines. As a general rule 
they do no t divide their time equally between both methods. 
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TABLE II-4 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FISHING FAMILY FIRMS IN THE 
AREAS SURVEYED 
Total number of 
captains surveyed 
Boats wit:h motor 
<30 hp 
Boats wi th motor 
>30 hp 
Average length of 
the boats in ft. 
Average power of 
the motor in hp 
Average number of 
traps owned 
Average number of 
men in the boat 
Average number of 
trap fishing days 
a year 
Average number of 
line fishing days 
a year 
Net average annual 
revenue from trap 
Net average annual 
revenue from line 
Number of fishermen 
using a winch 
Cabo Rojo 
14 
7 
7 
21.1 
46.8 
78.4 
1.9 
114.2 
3.2 
7933.1 
324.1 
7 
Aquadilla 
7 
1 
6 
17.7 
21.3 
8.4 
2.1 
10 
49.3 
356.6 
1412.77 
0 
-
Arecibo 
8 
0 
8 
16.9 
18.9 
0 
2.1 
0 
123 
0 
2066.4 
0 
Source: Data obtained by the author during a field survey 
1973-1974 of 50 ~ishermen 
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TABLE II-4 (continued) 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FISHING FAMILY FIRMS IN THE 
AREAS SURVEYED 
Total number of 
captains surveyed 
Boats with motor 
>30 hp 
Boats with motor 
<30 hp 
Average length of 
the boats in ft. 
Average power of 
the motor in hp 
Average number of 
traps owned 
Average number of 
men in the boat 
Average number of 
trap fishing days 
a year 
Average number of 
line fishing days 
a year 
Net average annual 
revenue from trap 
Net average annual 
revenue from line 
Number of fishermen 
using a winch 
Naguabo 
5 
3 
2 
19.6 
31. 2 
103 
2.2 
156 
0 
10553.1 
0 
1 
Salinas 
7 
1 
6 
16.7 
23.l 
41.7 
1.7 
130 
0.2 
4523.2 
7.1 
1 
Guanica 
9 
0 
9 
16.3 
10.4 
25.4 
1.1 
112 
0.2 
1548.2 
0.4 
3 
Source: Data obtained by the author during a field survey 
1973-1974 of 50 fishermen 
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TABLE II-5 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TRAP FISHING ENTERPRISE S 
ACCORDING TO THE POWER OF ENGINES 
Motor 
>30HP 
Motor 
$ 30HP 
Motor 
>40HP 
Total number of boats 12 38 6 
Boats used for trap 
fishing 12 27 6 
Boats used for trap 
and line fishing 5 4 4 
Average length of 
the boats (ft) 23.5 16.6 27.8 
Average power of 
the motor (HP) 60.4 15.3 80.8 
Average number of 
traps owned 89.5 41.4 132.3 
Average number of 
men in the boat 2.2 1.6 2.2 
Average number of trap 
fishing days in a year 100.1 76.1 126.8 
Average number of line 
fishing days in a year 3.8 2.5 5.5 
Net annual revenue 
from traps 10,854 3,139 14,506 
Net annual revenue 
from lines 435.8 54.1 745.7 
Number of fishermen 
using a winch 7 3 5 
Motor 
<40HP 
44 
33 
5 
17.0 
19.8 
52.1 
1. 7 
76 
2.5 
2662 
67.1 
5 
Source: Field survey of 30 fishermen, 1973-74 and Depart-
ment of Agriculture sale tickets for the period. 
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TABLE II-6 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LINE FISHING ENTERPRISES 
ACCORDING TO THE POWER OF THE ENGINE 
Motor Motor Motor Motor 
> 3 0 HP < 3 0 HP > 4 0 HP < 4 0 HP 
Number of boats sampled 12 38 6 44 
Boats used for line fishing 5 15 4 16 
Boats used for trap and 5 4 4 5 
line fishing 
Average length of boat (Ft.) 26.4 16.8 28.3 16.9 
Average Power of the 75.2 19.0 84.0 20.3 
motor (HP) 
Average number of men in 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
the boat 
Average number of trap- 117.6 6.7 146.8 6.4 
fishing days in a year 
Average number of line 9.2 66.1 8.3 62.8 
fishing days in a year 
Net annual revenue from 
traps 
15,219.3 250.1 ],9006.0 239.7 
Net annual revenue from 1,045.8 1,718.86 1118.86 1658.3 lines 
Source: Field survey of 20 fishermen, 1973-74 and 
Department of Agriculture sale tickets for the period. 
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This may be due to the preference of the fishermen, but it 
also reflects the natural conditions around the ports where 
the fishermen live. This tends to be confirmed by the fact 
that all the large boats were found in areas of trap fish-
ing (see Table II-4) where they are used for that type of 
fishing. In addition, larger boats are able to go to or 
beyond the edge of the continental shelf where most line 
fishing takes place. 
Table II-7 shows that most of the boats have two 
men on board. This class of boats is also the one which 
goes to sea more often (122.2 days between line fishing 
and trap fishing) . This is probably one of the reasons 
why it is the most successful economically with the 
average annual income by far the highest. The characte-
ristics (length and power) of the boats with two men is 
very similar to the characteristics of the boats with 
three men, while the boats with one man are, on the average 
smaller and less powerful. 
Most of the boats with three men are used for line 
fishing exclusively or in combination with trap fishing. On 
the contrary the boats with only one man are often used ex-
clusively for trap fishing. During the interviews it appeared 
that many of the fishermen fishing alone seemed older than 
the others. Although their age was not recorded. One ex-
ce t · P ion must be noted, however. It was mentioned earlier that 
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TABLE II-7 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FISHING ENTERPRISESACCORDING 
TO THE NUMBER OF MEN ON BOARD 
Total Boats with Boats with Boats with 
sample one man 
on board 
Number of boats 
Boats used for trap 
fishing 
Boats used for hand 
line fishing 
50 
39 
20 
Boats used for trap and 9 
hand line fishing 
Average length of the 18.3 
boats (ft) 
Average power of the 26.78 
engine (HP) 
Average number of 44.2 
traps owned 
Average number of trap 87.1 
fishing days in a year 
Average number of line 27.7 
fishing days in a year 
14 
12 
3 
1 
16.5 
11. 86 
24.3 
92.8 
10.1 
Annual revenue from 4859.03 2918.96 
traps and hand lines 
Number of boats equip- 11 
Ped with a winch 
4 
two men 
on board 
30 
23 
13 
6 
19.03 
32.43 
56.3 
93.7 
28.5 
62~9 . 53 
7 
three men 
on board 
6 
3 
4 
1 
19.2 
33.3 
30.0 
40.9 
64.1 
4049.19 
0 
Source: Data obtained by the author during a field survey 
·1973-1974 of 50 fis~ermen 
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in Guanica , many of the fishermen were alone in their 
boats r egardless of their age. 
Fr om the present data it is not possible to deduce 
that one of the classes of boats is more traditional than 
t he oth e r . The boats with only one man have a lower annual 
income a nd go at sea less often . However, the fact than one 
third of t ho se fishing with traps in that class are equipped 
with a winch tend to indicate that those boats are owned by 
fishermen who are open to technical inovations . (Only 11 
boats out o f the 39 fishing with traps in the whole sample 
have a winch) . The difference between the performance of 
the various type s of firms, particularly between those using 
more powerf ul b oats and those using les s powerful boats, 
suggest that ma ny factors influence the catch of the fish-
ermen. 
An econometric analysis of the data based on a theore-
tical mode l o f the fishing family firm will show the rela-
tive impor t a n c e o f the various inputs. 
A prior i , Table II-7 does not provide any reason t o 
suspect t hat the economic behavior of the f ishemen varies 
from one c las s o f boats to another . 
III REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The model of the fishing enterprise should show the 
costs of production as well as the returns to the firms. 
For the fishing industry and necessarily for the firm, the 
analysis must recognize the effects of fishing effort on 
the stock. Thus, a catch function which takes into ac-
count the effects of fishing effort on the growth of the 
fish population must be established. In the case of a 
static framework, which is what will be developed here, 
some notion of the biological equilibium at a given level 
of effort must be answered. 
Various models of the fishing industry have been 
developed which deal with various degrees of success with 
the special problems associated with a fish growth function 
which is affected by so called fishing externalities. 
These models all have the form of a system of equations 
showing the relationship between the level of the catch, 
the cost and the fish population growth. 
After the presentation of the catch function and the 
cost function it will be possible to turn to more practi-
cal problems. To estimate a catch function it is necessary 
to specify its form as well as the variables which will be 
chosen to enter in the regressions. In the fishery economic 
47 
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literature, the usual form of the catch function is a Cobb-
Douglas type production function. Dependent upon the fish-
eries , various independent variables have been selected to 
explain the level of the catch. Several surveys estimating 
ca t ch functions will be examined. 
When the model has been devised, and the form of 
the c a t ch function as well as the variables have been cho-
sen , a last problem remains. Since 1940 an _abundant lite-
rature has been devoted to the statistical difficulties of 
es t i ma ting production functions. It seems to have reached 
a consen s us in the mid-1960's. Many of the articles written 
on t h e s ubject will be reviewed and the present state of 
the agreement will be exposed. A theoretical model of the 
fish ing industry is presented in Section I. Studies, which 
have dealt with the choice of a catch function and the se-
lection o f the variables are reviewed in Section II. Final-
l y, Sec t ion III is a discussion of the econometric questions 
raised by the estimation of production functions. 
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I An Economic Model of the Fishing Industry 
The first economic model of the fishing industry was 
1 proposed by Gordon. It presented the economics of the 
f ishery in the context of a comparative static analysis. 
Thi s model was subsequently developed by various authors 
including Scott2 Turvey 3 and Smith. 4 
The model used in this study includes the latest 
de v e l o pments proposed by those economists. It is composed 
of t hree equations: 
(1 ) a recruitment rate function 
dX/dt = f (X, m, kx) 
X biomass 
m mesh size 
k number of vessels in the fishery 
x average vessel catch 
In a simpl er model m, which introduces mesh externalities; 
can be ignored . 
1 
H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property 
Resource : The Fishery", pp. 124-142 . 
2 
Anthony Scott, "The Fishery : The Objectives of Sole 
Ownership ", Journal of Political Economy, 63 (April, 1955) 
pp. 11 6- 124 . 
3 
Ralph Turvey, "Optimization in Fishery Regulation", 
~erican Economic Review, 54 (March, 1964), pp. 64-76. 
4 
Vernon L . Smith, "On Models of Commercial Fishing'', 
Journa l o f Political Economy, 77 (March/April, 1969), 
pp. 1 81-198 . 
(2) a catch function 
x = g(z,X,k) 
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x average vessel catch 
z input vector 
X biomass 
k number of vessels in the fishery 
In this equation, k, which represents crowding externali-
ties, can be ignored to simplify the model. 
(3) a cost function 
c = w z 
C total cost 
w vector of input prices 
z input vector 
A question arises concerning the possibility of applying 
a classical model such as this one to a traditional eco-
nomic activity. It was mentioned earlier that the artisan 
fishermen in Puerto Rico belonged for the most part to a 
traditional sector of the society, and, consequently, that 
many of their decisions were influenced by customs and 
common practice in the community. As a result it would not 
be appropriate to postulate that those fishermen are always 
economically rational, or, for instance, to assume that 
they are able to maximize their profits. However, it will 
be shown in the last section of this Chapter, that provi-
sions can be made to have the classical model account for 
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the lack of knowledge or the distorted perception of the 
economic environment (prices, technical coefficients) 
resulting from the social constraints. 
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II Definition of a Catch Function and Selection of 
the Variables 
The definition of a catch function raises questions 
which are often specific to the fishing industry inves-
tigated and to the species caught by that industry. How-
ever, much can be learned in reviewing earlier studies in 
which catch functions were estimated . Two kinds of inf or-
mation can be derived from the literature. One concerns 
the type of catch function fitted to the data; the other 
regards the choice of the dependent and independent varia-
bles. 
Most of the production studies assume that the exter-
nal diseconomies (Resource stock, crowding, mesh externa-
lities) are negligeable. 5 In only one instance does Bell 
5F d . J · • re eric<. W. Bell, "The Relation of the Production Func-
tion to the Yield on Capital for the Fishing Industry," 
Recent Developments and Research in Fisheries Economics, 
Ed. by F.W. Bell and J.E. Hazelton (Dobbs Ferry, New York: 
Oceana Publications, Inc., 1967). 
U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, "Gross Section Production 
Fu~ctions of North Atlantic Ground Fish and Tropical Tuna 
Seine Fisheries". · Earnest w. Carlson in Ocean Fishery 
Management: Discussions and Research, Ed . by A. A. Sokoloski, 
~OAA Technical Report 371, November, 1970 (Seattle, Wash-
ington, April 1973), pp. 42-56. 
. Bruno G. Noetzel and Virgil J. Norton, Cost and Earn-
~g~ in the Boston Large-Trawler Fleet, Economics of 
Marii:ie Resources, 8(University of Rhode Island Experiment 
Station No. 1329, Kingston, Rl-iode Island, 1969). 
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,_ 1. . 6 
a c count for resource stoch externa ities . When exter-
nal diseconomies are ignored, the catch functions used 
are of the Cobb- Douglas type . 
6 
Frederick hi . Bell, "Technological Externalities and Common 
Property Resources : An Empirical Study of the U.S. North-
~rn Lob s ter Fishery" . Journal of Political Economy, 80 
January / February, 1972), pp. 148-158 . 
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r The Dependent Variable 
The variables introduced in the catch function vary 
according to the fishery investigated. The dependent 
variable is usually the value of the landings 7 although 
8 9 
sometimes the weight of the catch is preferred. Carlson 
shows that when the fishermen have the choice of catching 
different species they "take into account expected prices, 
expected catch rates, and steaming time to the grounds and 
make decisions as to where to go and what to fish."lO In 
that case the value of the catch is a better measure of 
output (an example of such a situation is the New England 
trawler fleet). On the other hand, for the tropical tuna 
seine fisheries, the weight of the catch is a better mea-
sure of output because in the case of tropical tuna fish-
eries, "the species are ... joint products. That is, the 
fishermen take as much of both species (Yellow-fin and 
7 Bell, "The Relation of the Production Function to the 
Yield on Capital for the Fishing Industry." 
Bell, "Technological Externalities and Common Property 
Resources." 
8 
Noetzel and Norton, Cost and Earnings in the Boston 
Trawler Fleet. 
9 
Carlson, "Cross-section Production Functions." 
10 . ~., p. 47. 
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skyjack ) a s they can in an effort to fill their holds as 
quick ly as possible." 11 
II Th e Independent Variables 
The independent variables always include one or more 
measures of capital. Physical measures are chosen more 
frequentl y than monetary ones . Gross tonnage of the 
vessel and horsepower of the main engine are the most 
commonly chosen . 
In many s tudies some monetary value of the fixed 
asset is used as an independent variable . This has the 
advantage t ha t i t allows for a more immediate estimate 
of the return on capital. The problem then arises of 
choosing a mo ng various measures of the value of capital . 
This difficulty is not specific to the fishing industry 
and the literature dealing with that question is abun-
dant. Bell uses historical book value of assets but he 
notes that t hi s method, "presents many difficulties. 
First each b alance sheet reflects different prices de-
pending on the date o f acquisition of the assets . Most 
fishing v e ssels are sold often during their lifetimes 
and (histor i c al book values) actually reflect the last 
purchase o r r esale price . 1112 For those reasons he also 
11 
Carlson, "Cross-section Production Function." p. 49. 
12 
y·Bell, "The Relation of the Production Function to its 
ield on Capital for the Fishing Industry", p. 91. 
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suggests a method of adjusting historical prices to constant 
dollars. This a pproach is questionable since it does not 
take into account the life of the boat. Usually, some 
measure of depreciation is preferred to a mesure of total 
assets. In estimating agricultural production functions. 
The historical tendency has been ... to measure 
the input of durable assets by the actual main-
tenance and depreciation costs associated with 
their ~se rather th~n ~~ their capital value 
on an inventory basis. 
If this measure of capital is selected some difficulties 
remain, however, since there are various alternatives to 
compute depreciation costs. "A practicable measure of 
the true cost of using a machine for a particular purpose 
is the return from the next most profitable use of re-
placement-cost depreciation, whichever is highern. 14 
Opting for replacement-cost hardly solves the pro-
blem, for "Reproduction cost is an imaginary cost 1115 and 
one has to decide upon a definition of replacement cost. 
For instance, should it be "the current cost of a new 
13 
Earl 0. Heady and John L. Dillon, Agricultural Production 
Function (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1961), 
p. 221. 
14 
M H. Speight, Economics and Industrial Lfficiency 
acMillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), p. 184. 
(London: 
15 
Charles F . Phillips Jr., The Economics of Regulation 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1969), p. 235. 
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vessel to replace a similar vessel in the fleet 1116 or the 
current cost of a similar used vessel? 
Given the difficulties discussed above, present mar-
ket value of the asset appears to be especially useful 
given its practical advantage of being relatively easily 
determined. In Holmsen's study of the small trawler fleet. 
The owner of the vessel was asked what he considered 
the market value. This figure was checked with the 
last appraisal of the vessel by an independent sur-
veyor either for a bank or for an insurance firm. 
The rate of depreciation was determined by asking 
the owner how long the thought he would keep the 
vessel and, asswning a constant price level, what 
he thought the different components t~7n would be 
worth (sales value or salvage value) . 
This approach is particularly useful in the case of 
an artisanal fishery where some of the boats are built 
by the fishermen themselves. 
Another problem arising when estimating catch functions 
is the measurement of management. This has received little 
attention in fisheries studies. Be1118 and Noetzel and 
16 
Crutchfield and Zellner, Economic Aspects of the Pacific 
Halibut Fishery, p. 78. 
17 
Andreas A. Holmsen, "The Economics of the Small Trawler 
Fleet, "Recent Developments and Research in Fisheries 
Economics, Ed. by F.W. Bell and J.E. Hazleton (Dobbs 
Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1967) p. 126. 
18 
.Bell, "The Relation of the Production Function to the 
Yield on Capital for the Fishing Industry." 
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19 
. ff . t b t . 1 f b t Norton di erencia e e ween various c asses o oa s 
by introducing dummy variables for different sizes. This 
method is similar to the one used to test for differences 
of technical efficiency among groups of producers. Al -
though Bell finds a significant difference between the 
economic performance of the small boats and of the big 
20 boats he believes that the data available are not suf-
ficient to decide what causes this disparity. 
More numerous examples of attempts at measuring 
management can be found in farm management studies. In 
most of t his work the methodology used is directly linked 
to the mean chosen to estimate the production functions. 
For that reason it will be treated in the next section 
which deals with estimation of the catch function. 
19 
Noetzel and Norton , Costs and Earnings in the Boston 
!!_awler Fleet. 
20 
Bell, "The Relation of the Production to the Yield on 
Capital for the Fishing Industry," p. 114. 
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III Es timating the Catch Function 
Cobb-Douglas functions are those most frequently 
used to describe catch functions. This section will con-
sider t h e problems associated with estimating a function 
o f that f o rm . Then some remarks will follow dealing with 
the a ctual measurement of diverse types of managerial 
abilities. 
I Estimating a Cobb-Douglas Production Function. 
Marsch a k and Andrews are among the first economists 
to have given much attention to the difficulties of pro-
1 . . d . f . 21 per y estima ting pro uction unctions. They show that 
"the economist is confronted not only with a single equa-
tion, but ·with a system of ( . .. ) equations none of which 
h . ,, 22 e can ign o re . 
This system of equations contains a "production 
equation ." In a two-input case it will have the form: 
( 3-1) 
where x 0 is the level of output and x 1 and x 2 are the in-
puts. It also includes two "marginal-productivity equa-
tions": 
21 
. Jacob Mar s chak and William H. Andrews Jr., "Random 
Simultaneous Equations and the Theory of Production", 
pp. 14 3-20 5 
221 ~., p . 144. 
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(3-2) 
where p
0
, p 1 , and p 2 are respectively the prices of x 0 , 
x
1
, and x 2 . Those equations are further specified by 
introducing the concepts of "technical efficiency" and 
"economic efficiency". 
The production function will change, even within 
the same industry, from firm to firm and from 
year to year, depending on the technical know-
ledge, the will, the effort and luck of a given 
entrepreneur; these facto23 can be summarized 
as "technical efficiency". 
Assuming that the production function is the same for 
all firms except for the "technical efficiency" represented 
by Ef (3-1) will become: 
(3-3) XO= ¢(xl,x2,Ef) 
Then "economic efficiency" is defined by Marschak and 
Andrews as "The ability or willingness to choose, or luck 
in choosing the most profitable combination of resources 11 • 24 
However, in the more recent literature what was called 
"economic efficiency" by Marschak and Andrews is now re-
ferred to as "Price efficiency". "A firm is price effi-
cient if it maximizes profits i.e., it equates the value 
23 . ~-, p. 145. 
241 
_bid., p. 145. 
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of the marginal product of each variable input to its 
. " 25 price . 
on the other hand, in the latest literature, the con-
cept of "economic efficiency'' is used to refer to the com-
bination of technical and price efficiency. This termino-
logy will be used throughout the remainder of this study. 
Economic efficiency accounts "for firms that produce diffe-
rent quantities of output from a given set of measure in-
puts of production. This is the component of differences 
in technical efficiency ... It also takes into account that 
different firms succeed to varying degrees in maximizing 
profits, i.e., in equating the value of the marginal pro-
duct of each variable factor of production to its price. 
This is the component of price efficiency 11 • 26 
Introducing price efficiency µf and Bf into the "mar-
ginal-productivity equation, "equations (3-2) becomes: 
(3-4)ox0 /ox1 =A (µf' p 1 /p0 ), ox0 /ox2= K(8f,p2/p0 ) 
The next step is to find a proper method to estimate 
these equations and to express the model accordingly. 
25 
Lawrence J. Lau and Pan A. Yotopoulos, "A Test of Relative 
Efficiency and Application to Indian Agriculture", American 
~conomic Review, 61 (March, 1971), p. 95. 
26 ~., p. 95. 
x2 
62 
If we desire to estimate the value of x if x 
and x 2 should be determined not by that
0
set of 
random causes which existed in the past but by 
deliberate action then we have to estimate the 
coefficients in the equation (3-3) .27 
In fact, since "each of the three variables x o' 
changes as the result of variations in the random 
xl' 
fea-
tures £ ' µ ' e ' from firm to firm. 
,,28 One has to estimate 
simultaneously the system of equations (3-3) (3-4) since 
least squares estimates of equation (3-3) alone will be 
biased and inconsistent. 
In the case of a production function of the Cobb-
Douglas type: 
(3-5) x 
0 
u 
0 
u0 = random variable with mean unity. 
Under perfect competition (this assumption will be 
maintained throughout this chapter) the system of equa-
tions to be estimated can be written: 
(3-6) x - a xli -a2x2i = /.. +v oi oi 1 0 
(3-7) x oi-xli /..l+Vli 
l3-8) x .-x2 . = /..2+V2i 01 J_ 
27 
Marschak and Andrews, "Random Simultaneous Equations 
and the Theory of Production," p. 151. 
28 . ~-, p.150. 
where 
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x .. = log x .. Jl Jl 
J= 0,1,2 
>. = 
0 
log A 
v oi' vli' v2i are random variables 
E(Vki) = 0 k = 0,1,2 
E(Voi' vli) 
{ E (Vk. ) '} 2 = 
'l 
is independent of i 
for all firms 
"1 = log (pl/poa l) 
"2 = log (p2/p o a 2) 
Po' P1' P2 are the respective prices of x 1 , x2, x3 
v
0
i can be called "technical disturbance" and v 1 i 
and v 2i "price disturbance". 
Little was added to Marschak and Andrews' model until 
Hoch, 29 concerned with the problems stemming from the es-
timation of the system of equations, added a new element 
to the theoretical framework. In the early model, E(Vli) = 
E(V2i) = 0, and v 1 i and v 2i are measures of the price effi-
ciency or inefficiency). "In this approach, however, the 
'average' firm is defined to be the optimal firm 11 • 30 
29 
Irving Hoch, "Simultaneous Equation Bias in the Contest 
of the Cobb-Douglas Production", Econometrica, 26 (October, 
19 58)' pp. 566-578. 
301 ~-, p. 567. 
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Hoch proposes to keep the properties of v1 i and v 2 i un-
changed but to introduce a term Rj such that in equations 
(3-7) and (3-8) 
(3-9) 
A . becomes: 
J 
\ J. = log(p.R ./p a. ) 
J J 0 J 
In equation (3-9) R . represents the effects of dis-
J 
turbances which affect all the firms and prevent them from 
maximizing their profit. 
"In this formulation, R . can of course vary among 
J 
firms: but, for a sample of firms, the investigator would 
be interested in testing whether the average R. is equal 
J 
to one. 1131 
This precision added to the accuracy of the tradi-
tional model. Yet a problem remained concerning the mea-
ning of V . . Walters notes, that 
01-
Marschak and Andrews interpret the disturbance as 
analogous to an experimental error. But there is 
more to it than that. The variation in output of 
a particular firm from year to year may be due to 
exogenous random causes (such as the weather) but 
the differences between one firm and another due 
to the 'ability' of the entrepreneur w~~l be con-
stant over time for a particular firm. 
31Ib ' ~·r p. 568. 
32 
A.A. Walters, "Production and Cost Functions: An 
Econometric Survey ," Econometrica, 31 (January/April, 
1963) ' p. 14. 
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one may add that even for cross-section data the 
variation in output between different firms may be part-
ly due to "exogenous random causes" such as different 
quality inputs. If this is so one can write 
(3-10) V . = V . ++V . * 
01. 01. 01. 
Where V . measures the technical efficiency while V .* 
01. 01. 
is a stochastic disturbance representing the "exogenous 
33 
random causes". But now output is a function of V . *. 
01. 
Consequently, 
... the production function and profit function for 
the individual entrepreneur are stochastic ... Thus, 
the rationale for assuming deterministic profit 
maximixation, as is done in the traditional approach, 
is at variance with the above interpretation of V . ; 
an interpretation which appears to be consistent 01 
with that in the literature.34 
Recognizing this conflict, Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze 
propose a new model where the production function of each 
firm is stochastic: 
(3-11) x 
0 
a 
= AX l 
1 e 
u . 
01. 
... Where u . is a random disturbance representing 
factors su8fi as weather, unpredictable variations 
in machine or labor performance and so on. When-
ever the production process is not instantaneous, 
the effect of the disturbance on output cannot be 
known until after the preselected quantities of 
inputs have been employed in production.35 
33 
A. Zellner, J. Kmenta, and J. Dreze, "Specification and 
Estimation of Cobb-Douglas Production Function Models", 
Econometrica, 34 (October, 1966), p. 786. 
34 1 ~., p. 786. 
35 ~-, p. 787. 
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It is assumed that the entrepreneur attempts to maxi-
mize his expected profit and that the prices are known 
with certainty. 
Expected profit can be expressed as: 
(3-12) 
if u is normally distributed, N (u , a ) 
0 0 oo 
( 3-13) E(X ) 
0 = 
Even if the prices are perfectly known, the entre-
preneur may not use the optimum combination of inputs. The 
production model becomes 
= a + u . 0 Ol 
(3-15) x . 
Ol = k' + u + u 1 oi li 
(3-16) x . 
Ol = k' 2+ u . + Ol U2i 
with k~ = log(p.R./p a.) -~a 
J J J 0 J 00 
Putting the model in reduced form: 
(l-a 1 -a 2 ) 
(3-18) xli = {ao + (a2-l) ki -a2k2+ (a2-l)uoi -alu2i}/ 
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(3-19) x21 = {ao+ (a l-1) k2 - a lkl + (a l-l)u2i-a lili }/ 
(1-a - a ) 1 2 
It appears that x 1 i and x 2i are independent of u0 i. 
This has important practical consequences, 
Clearly in the new model with the assumptions that 
E(u . , u1 .) = E(u . ,u2 . ) = 0, simple least squares oi i oi. i . . 
estimators are consistent; under normality, or with 
the stronger assumption that u . and u . are statis-
tically independent of u . , th~9 are afso unbiased.36 
oi 
This is useful result since it is now possible to 
obtain estimates of the production function using single 
least squares estimators of the logarithm of the produc-
tion function. 
Marschak and Andrews' model was criticized, however, 
because it did not allow for the possible existence of a 
random element in the variable V (V was a measure of 
0 0 
technical efficiency). The opposite criticism can be direc-
ted to the new model for not allowing the possibility of a 
variable accounting for managerial ability in the term u .. 
oi 
In practice, however, many economists use single least 
squares to estimate the logarithmic form of the production 
function. At the same time they interpret u . as measuring 
oi 
both exogenous random causes and the technical ability of 
the entrepreneur. In a study of Indian agriculture Lau and 
36 
!,Pid., p. 789. 
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and Yotopoulos write 
Here we assume that the error in the profits is 
due to climatic variation, ... , imperfect knowledge 
of the technical efficiency parameter of the farm 
and differences in technical efficiency among farms 
within the same size class.37 
Yet they add 
Hence one can estimate the natural logarithms of 
the profit function alone with the least squares 
estimator which in this case turns out to be mini-
mum variance, linear and unbiased.38 
Despite these difficulties in interpreting the distur-
bance term, in empirical studies, single equation least 
squares is 
... quite the most popular method of estimating the 
parameters of the Cobb-Douglas function ... The 
attractive properties of the least squares single 
equation method are the simplicity of computations, 
the small standard errors of the coefficients and 
the high level efficiency in predecting output for 
g~ven inputs.39 
All the studies of catch function mentioned earlier 
used that method of estimation. Many instances of that 
practice can also be found in agricultural economics. 40 
36 Ib1'd., p. 789. 
37 Lau and Yotopoulos, "A Tests of Relative Efficiency;;" 
p . 104. 
38Ib' ~., pp. 104-105. 
39 
Walters, "Production and Cost Function," pp. 18-19. 
40 
Heady and Dillon, Agricultural Production Functions. 
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In most cases estimating the production function is 
but one step of the analysis. Being able to comment on 
the economic efficiency of the firms or of several groups 
of firms is just as important for the researcher. 
II Measuring Economic Efficiency. 
Considering the system of equation ( 3- 6) , ( 3- 7) , 
and (3-8) where, now 
(3-20)>.. = log p . + log R. -log Po -loga . J J J J 
(3-2l)x 
- a lxli - a 2x2i = >. + v oi 0 oi 
From equation (3-21) it appears immediately that V . Ol 
cannot be estimated alone and that only the quantity V .+ 
Ol 
>- 0 can be computed. Consequently, it is impossible to de-
fine a perfectly technically efficient firm. Nevertheless, 
if one distinguishes two groups of firms with the same pro-
duction function, it is possible to compare the technical 
efficiency of the two groups by introducing a dummy variable 
S taking the value 1 for one group, 0 for the other, such 
that 
and then test for o=O. If o=O no group of firms is 
significantly more or less technically efficient than the 
Other. 
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To conduct tests on price efficiency note that equa-
tions (3-20) and (3-23) can be written: 
(3-24) x . +log p . - x .. -log p. =log R.-loga.+V .. 
Ol Ol Jl J J J Jl 
posing: y 0 i x . + log p 0 Ol 
y . . = x . . + log p . 
Jl Jl J 
where y . is the logarithm of the total revenue while Ol 
y .. is the logarithm of the amount of money spent on input 
Jl 
j . 
(3-25) y . - y .. =log R. -log a .+ v .. 
Ol Jl J J Jl 
Two kinds of tests are possible. Taking the averages 
Y . and y . . from all firms i = 1 ... , n. one can tests if 
Ol Jl 
Y0 i - yji is significantly different from -log a j, which 
is equivalent to testing for log R. = 0 or R. = 1 since 
J J 
E(V .. ) = 0 by definition. 
Jl 
An alternative method of computation yields the same 
results. Instead of using the logarithms of the total 
revenue and of the various outlays, the same test can be 
conducted taking the geometric means of the total revenue 
and the various outlays. 
Consider the anti-logarithm of equation (3-25) 
(3-26) y . Ol 
y . . 
Jl 
R . 
= _l_ 
a . 
J 
v .. 
e Ji 
where y0 i = log Y0 i and yji log y .. Jl 
71 v . . 
For a sample of n firms E(e Jl) = 1 
The maintained hypothesis is then: 
n l/n 
(3-27) H: II (Y 1 /Y .. ) = l/a. 0 i=l 0 Jl J 
which is the same as testing for 
( 3- 2 8) R. = 1 
J 
since E(V . . ) = O. Jl 
If H is rejected the conclusion is that "firms in 
0 
the sample ( ... ) exhibit systematic errors, perhaps as a 
result of institutional or other constraints, with respect 
to satisfying the first order conditions 11 • 41 This kind of 
test has often been performed on agricultural production 
f . 42 unctions. 
Using either equation (3-25) or equation(3-26) another 
kind of test can also be conducted. 
Since R. tends to be the same for all firms, instead 
J 
of taking the geometric means 
n 
(II 
i=l 
y . ) 
Ol 
l/n n 
and( II Y .. ) 
i=l Jl 
l/n 
for the whole sample, one can divide the sample into classes 
and compute the geometric means for the firms in each class. 
If the sample is divided into two groups containing 
respectively s and n-s firms the maintained hypothesis will 
be: 
41 
Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze, "Specification and Estimation 
Of the Cobb-Douglas Production Function Models", p. 785. 
42 
Heady and Dillon, Agricultural Production Functions, 
p. 570 and ff. 
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s l/s n l/n-s 
( 3- 2 9) H
0
: IT ( Y . /Y .. ) 
i=l Ol J l 
IT (Y . /Y .. ) 
i-s+l Ol Jl 
which is equivalent to testing 
s v .. h v . . Jl 
( 3-30 1 Ee 1 Ee Jl 
s i=l n-s i=S+l 
If H
0 
is not rejected the two groups of firms are as 
price efficient (or as price-inefficient) . If H is re-
o 
jected one group is more price efficient than the other. 
Finally, one remark concerning the hypothesis of 
equation (3-26) should be added. If one assumes that R. 
J 
is always equal to unity then hypothesis H is always true 
0 
and equation (3-26) provides another method to compute 
the coefficients of the production function. This i s re-
£erred to as the factor shares method. Despite its ob-
vious simplicity it has not been used frequently. 
The reason for this neglect was probably the desire 
of early authors to test their estimates of the pro-
duction function against the known facts about ~he 43 distribution of income among factors of production. 
As mentioned earlier, the classical model, with its 
assumption of maximized profit, was not adequate to repre-
sent the true economic behavior a traditional economic ac-
tivity. But the introduction of the concept of price effi-
ciency eliminates this objection and it is now possible to 
conceive a theoretical model, based on the classical approach 
Which will apply to trap and hand line fishing in Puerto Rico. 
43 
Walters, "Production and Cost Function", p. 21 
IV DEFINITION OF THE CATCH FUNCTION 
AND THE TESTS OF EFFICIENCY: 
A THEORETICAL APPROACH 
In this chapter a model is developed to represent the 
fishing operations with traps and with lines as well as the 
costs associated with these activities. The prices of the 
output and of the input will be assumed constant. In the 
case of the output the prices recorded by the Puerto Rican 
Department of Agriculture show very little change over the 
1 
months and sometimes over the years. As for the inputs such 
as motors, winches, chicken wire, lines etc., they are sold 
by the Department of Agriculture and their prices are also 
quite stable. 
Th~ catch functions are defined in Section I and many 
of the characteristics of the classical models introduced. 
Next the catch functions are expressed in an econometric 
form and some simplifications introduced; in Section III 
the concepts of technical and price efficiencies are intro-
duced in the model and the difficulties arising from the 
designing of statistical tests for the various efficiencies 
1 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Agriculture, 
Status of Fisheries in Puerto Rico, 1972 by Jose A. Suarez 
Caabro, Agricultural and Fisheries Contribution, Vol. V, 
No. 3, Puerto Rico, p. 48. 
73 
74 
discussed. Finally, in Section IV a practical problem 
dealing with the imputation of some fixed costs among 
several activities will be examined. 
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r Definition of the Catch Functions. 
Let X . be the annual catch of firm i from traps Toi 
i=l ... m 
Let X . be the annual catch of firm i from hand Loi 
lines i = m-s ... n 
In this notation, m firms practice trap fishing, 
n-m+s firms practice hand line fishing and s firms prac-
tice both. 
The catch functions can be written: 
Q a q 
( 4-1) x . = KTMT N II XTqi Toi q=l 
Q Sq ( 4-2) XLoi = KLML N II XLqi q=l 
XToi = annual catch from traps 
XLoi = annual catch from hand lines 
KT and KL are constant terms 
MT and ML represent crowding externalities 
and mesh externalities 
Q 
II 
q=l 
x . Tqi 
Q 
and II XL . are input vectors representing 
q=l qi 
capital, labor and management used by the firm when fishing, 
respectively, with trap and hand lines. 
N is the fish population. 
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s ince the model is developed in the framework of 
compa rative statics it is assumed that the fish popula-
tion s is in equilibrium at N. 
MT and ML measure the effects of the crowding exter-
nal i t ies and of the mesh externalities upon the catch 
from traps and the catch from lines. The crowding facto r 
ma y b e due to the number of boats or to the number of 
trap s o n the same fishing grounds which force the fisher-
men to be more careful or to spend more gasoline to navi-
gate i n tho s e areas. The mesh size used to build the traps 
affects the population of fish caught by lines. It is pro-
bable that in reality this effect is different upon the two 
populations . Yet in both cases the mechanism is the same 
with t he bigger mesh size releasing the bigger fish which 
ca.n keep participating in the population reproduction pro-
cess. 
Th e difficulty of assessing the value of MT and ML is 
obvi ous but in a study of the fishing industry at a given 
point in time they are fixed. When estimating the catch 
funct i ons their value will be embodied in a constant term 
a.pp . . f f h t . 2 earing in ront o t e equa ion. 
Th e equilibrium population N depends upon some natu-
ral fac t o rs as well as on the fishing pressure. 
I f no fishing takes place, the fish populations's 
2 E.c. Pielou, An Introduction to Mathematical Ecology, 
Wiley Interscience (New York, 1969). 
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growth rate is given by the Verhulst-Pearl equation. 2 
(4-3) dN/dt = N (a-bN) 
where dN/dt is the growth rate of the fish population over 
time 
N is the size of the population at a moment in time 
a is the rate of natural increase 
a = ¢ - µ 
¢ birth rate of each individual 
µ death rate of each individual 
a/b = N* is the maximum size that the population can reach. 
Equation (4-3) can also be written 
(4-4) dN/dt = bN (N*N) 
If the fishery is exploited it becomes necessary to 
account for man's effect on the resource. The growth rate 
of the fish population is then: 
(4-5) dN/dt = bN (N*-N) - FN 
where FN is the catch rate and F is the fishing mortality 
coefficient. 
In a steady-state situation dN/dt = 0, which means 
that there is no change in the level of the population 
over time. 
(4-6) bN(N*-N) - FN = 0 
If such an equilibrium is reached, equation (4-6) is 
valid over any period of time provided that the rates bN 
and FN correspond to that same period of time. 
2 W~l· C. Pielou, An Introduction to Mathematical Ecology , 
1 ey Interscience (New York, 1969). 
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If a period of one year is chosen, FN is the annual 
catch. 
In the present study, if it is assumed: 
1) that the population is homogeneous and therefore 
that interspecies relationships can be ignored , 
2) that the catch affects the population in the same 
fashion, whatever the fishing method used, then FN can 
be divided in three elements 
EXT . 
. Ol 
l 
IXL . 
. 01 
l 
EZ. 
. l 
l 
= total annual catch from traps 
total annual catch from hand lines 
= total annual catch from all other methods. 
Combining equations (4-1) , (4-2) and (4-6) the growth rate 
of the fish population is now 
Q 
(4-7) bN (N*-N) - ~(KTMTN) IT 
l q=l 
- E Z. = 0 
i l 
Dividing by N, with N ~ 0 
Q ai Q Bq 
(4-8) b(N*-N) - ~ (KT~ IT , XT .) - E ( KLMLN TI XLqi) 
l q=l qi i q=l 
- F A = 0 
where F is the fishing mortality coefficient from other A 
fishing methods. 
Equation (4-8) expresses the biological constraint 
to which the industry is s ubj ect when maximizing p r ofit. 
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From equation ( 4-8) it is 
Q 
possible to deduce: 
( 4-9) N 
-
IT 
q=l 
a q 
XTqi) 
Q s 
- L (K M IT X q.) 
i L Lq=l Lqi 
Replacing N in equations (4-1) and (4-2) by its value 
from equation (4-9) the catch functions can be written: 
Q a Q S { * 1 {" ( (4-10) XToi = N ~ KTMT 
b i 
IT XTq.)- L (KLML IT XLq.) 
q=l qi i q=l qi 
(4-11) XL . 
oi 
Q 
- FA }} KTMT IT 
q=l 
1 
a q XT . qi 
Q a Q' S 
= {N* - - {L. (KTMT IT XTqi.)- L (KLML IT X q. 
b i q=l q q=l Lqi 
Q 
rr 
q=l 
sq 
x . Lqi 
Equations (4-10) and (4-11) reveal the presence of 
externalities in the fisheries since the catch of firm i 
is a function not only of its fishing effort but also of the 
total fishing effort in the fisheries. 
Yet, at a given point in time, N is fixed and for a 
cost-production analysis of a fishing industry in a given 
year, the catch functions can be estimated in the form given 
in equations (4-1) and (4-2). 
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Q Cl 
XToi = (KTMTN) TI 
q 
XTqi 
q=l 
or 
Q Cl 
(4-12) XToi A IT 
q 
XTqi q=l 
and 
Q' s 
XLoi (KL ML N) IT q = XLqi q=l 
or 
Q s q (4-13) XLoi = B IT XLqi q=l 
81 
II Econometric Formulation of the Catch Functions 
c onsider the general catch function: 
(4 - 14) X = A 0 
Q 
TI 
q=l 
a 
x q 
q 
Fo llowing Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze 3 it will be assu-
med t hat the catch function of firm i is stochastic and of 
the form 
Q a u 
( 4 - 15) x = A TI x q OJ. with u .-N(O, a· ) e 
oi q=l qi OJ. 00 
I n a ddition, it is assumed that the prices of the in-
puts a re known with certainty and that the fishermen maxi-
mize t h e expected profit. 
(4-16) E( TI .) = p E(X .) - t p X . 
l. 0 OJ. q qi 
where p
0 
i s the price of the output and pq is the price of 
input q 
From equation 
(4-1 7) E(X .) 
OJ. 
(4-15) 
Q 
= A TI 
q=l 
~a 
00 
e 
a is t he variance of the catch function disturbance. 00 
3
This e xpose follows the developments in Zellner, Kmenta 
& Dreze "Specification and Estimation of Cobb-Douglas Pro-
duction Function Models". 
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The first order conditionsto maximize the expected 
profit are represented by q equations: 
(4-18) aE (Xoi) 
ax . 
(4-19) 
qi 
a x .e q oi 
ax . qi 
~a 
00 
Equation (4-19) can be assimilated to an ex-ante expression. 
That is, it represents the conditions which should be met 
if expected profit is to be maximized. It applies to the 
situation before any fishing takes place. However, after 
the fishing, ex-post, the catch and the profit become 
actual values which now differ from the expected ones by 
u . 
the stochastic term e oi 
written. 
(4-20) 
~a 
00 
a. X . e q oi 
u . 
X . e oi 
qi 
Ex-post the situation can be 
or, taking the natural logarithm of equation (4-20) 
(4-21) lnX . - lnX . = lnp - lnp -lna. - ~a +u . 
oi qi q 0 q 00 oi 
In reality, it is likely that the first order condi-
tions for maximizing profit will not be exactly satisfied. 
Two sets of reasons may concur to lead to a less than op-
timum combination of inputs: 
83 
a) The firms may be subject to a common set of 
conditions which influence the ir choice of the q uantity 
o f inputs . Those conditions may b e d ue to tradition or 
to the institutions. In that case, a term Rq, common 
to al l firms, may be introduced in the first order con-
dition equations to account for that <listurbance. 
(4 - 22) lnX . 
oi lnX . qi = lnp - lnp - lna q q 0 
writing 
(4 - 23) 
+ u . 
oi 
k = lnp - lnp - .!a - lna q q 0 2 00 q 
Equation (4-22) becomes 
(4 - 24) ln X . - ln X . = 
oi qi u . oi 
- .la 2 00 
b } Besides the traditional and institutional dis-
turbances common to all firms, each fisherman will per-
ceive di fferently his own operation as well as the common 
set o f output and input prices. This different percep-
tion will make each entrepeneur choose quantities of in-
puts whic h, probably, will be at variance from the amounts 
he ought to use to maximize profit. This can be accounted 
for b y introducing a term u . N(O,a ) in the first order qi - qq 
condi t ions . 
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(4-25) ln X . - lnX . = k + R + u . + u . 
oi qi q q oi qi 
The logarithm of the catch function in (4-15) and 
the q first order conditions (4-25) represent a system of 
q + 1 equations. 
Without loss of generality the problem can be reduced 
to a situation with two inputs and the system of 3 equa-
tions can be written: 
(4-26) lnX 
(4-27) lnX 
(4-28) lnX 
where a = lnA 
0 
-
oi 
oi 
oi 
a 1 ln xli 
lnXli = 
lnX 2i = 
- a 2lnx 2i = a 
+ 
0 
kl + Rl + uli + 
k2 + R2 + u2i + 
From this set of equations it follows that: 
(4-29) lnX = {a - al (kl + Rl + uli) oi 0 
+ u2i)+ u. (1 - a - a ) } I (1-io 1 2 
(4-30) lnXli = {a + 0 (a 2 - 1) (kl + Rl 
- a (k2 + R2 + u2i) }/ (1 - a l -2 
(4-31) lnX 2i = {a + 0 (a l - 1) (k2 + R2 
- a (kl + Rl + uli) } I (1 - a l 1 
u 
oi 
u 
oi 
u 
oi 
- a 2(k + q 
a l - a ) 2 
+ uli) 
a 2) 
+ u2i) 
- a 2) 
R2 
This shows that, assuming that the u1 i and u 2i are statis-
tically independent of u . , lnx1 . and lnx2 . are also sta-oi i i 
tistically independent of u . , and consequently, the least 
oi 
square estimate of (4-26) is consistent and unbiased. 
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A special case arises in the fishery when any kind of 
lay system is used to pay the crew members. In what situa-
tion the total wage actually paid is a function of the 
actual output. Yet it can be assumed that the amount of 
labor hired is a function of the expected output, since 
the decision of hiring is taken before the fishing trips. 
In the simplest lay s y stem: 
(4-32) = y {p E(X .) 0 Ol 
assuming, in this case, that E(X .) is a function of 3 in-
01 
puts xl' x2' x3, expected profit becomes: 
(4- 33 ) E( IT i) = poE(Xoi) - plXli - p3X3i 
- y{ poE(Xoi) - P3X3i } 
The system of equations (4-26), (4-27), and(4-28) must now 
be written: 
(4-34) 
(4-35) 
(4-36) 
a + u . 
0 Ol 
It is immediately apparent that the system of equations 
(4-34), (4-35), and (4-36) can be solved to show that even 
When there is a lay system the levelsof the inputs are in-
dependent of u . . In addition, it appears that another 
Ol 
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equation is necessary to determine the amount of labor 
In the present study X will be considered given, 
2i 
or, which is the same, determined by factors outside the 
model. 
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III The Measures of Efficiency 
I Technical Efficiency 
Considering two groups of firms A and B, for each 
there exists: 
(4-37) a + u 
o oi 
in group Ai= 1 ...... s-1 
in group Bi - s ...... n 
If it is assumed that the two groups of firms have the 
same production function except for a parameter represent-
ing technical efficiency, it is possible to test if this 
parameter takes significantly different values in each 
group. This can be done by estimating equation (4-37) 
separately for group A and group B. This will provide 
two estimates, 6
0
A for group A and 6
0
B for group B. Assu-
ming that E(u . ) = 0 for any group of firms, it is possi-
oi 
ble to test for Ho: a0 A = 60 B. 
Another and simpler method consists in estimating: 
(4-38) lnX . = a + u . + o .S. + a 1 lnX1 . + a 2 lnx2 . Ol 0 Ol l l l l 
where 
S . = 1 for i = 1 s-1 
l 
S. = O for i = s n 
l 
If o is not significantly different from zero the two 
groups of firms do not have significantly different tech-
nical efficiencies. 
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Dummy variables can be used to test relative effi-
ciency among more than two groups of firms. For instance, 
the firms may be divided in group A (fishermen not using 
that technique). Another classification can be added to 
those two groups, for instance, firms from region I, 
region 2, and region 3. 
In this case, equation (4-37) becomes: 
(4-39) a. + u . + o1 s1 0 01. 
where the values of s1 , s 2 , and s 3 are 0 or 1 according 
to the subset to which firm i belongs. 
Table IV-I gives the values of s1 , s 2 , s 3 for the 
. 4 
various cases. 
Each subgroup but one will be characterized by the 
presence of one or more of the o1 in its production func-
tion as shown by Table IV-2. 
For firms of the same region o3 is a measure of the 
relative efficiency of technique B over technique A. For 
firms using the same technique, o1 and o2 respectively mea-
sure the relative technical efficiency of region 2 and re-
gion 3 over region 1. 
Tests can be conducted to check if one coefficient 
or one group of coefficients is significantly different 
4 
Arthur S. Golberger, Econometric Theory, (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964) pp. 222-223. 
Regions 
I 
I 
II 
II 
III 
III 
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TABLE IV-1 
THE USE OF DUMMY VARIABLES WHEN TWO 
INDEPENDENT CRITERIA DIVIDE THE 
SAMPLE IN SEVERAL SUBSETS 
Techniques Used sl 
A 0 
B 0 
A 1 
B 1 
A 0 
B 0 
s2 s3 
0 0 
0 1 
0 0 
0 1 
1 0 
1 1 
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TABLE IV-2 
COEFFICIENT OF THE DUMMY 
VARIABLES IN EACH SUBSET 
Regions Techniques 
A B 
I a a + 0 3 0 0 
II a + 01 a + 01 + 0 3 0 0 
III a + 02 a + 02 + 0 3 0 0 
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from zero. This would reveal if there is a significant 
difference in the various levels of technical efficiency. 
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II Price Efficiency 
Two tests can be conducted concerning price efficien-
cy. One relates to the eventual existence of constraints 
common to all firms and expressed in the term R of equa-q 
tion (4-22). The second test concerns the term u . in qi 
the same equations, it is a measure of eventual price in-
efficiency in a given firm or group of firms. 
1. Testing for constraints common to all firms. 
Equation (4-36) can be written, taking the averages 
over all firms: 
(4-40) lnX . - lnX . + lnp + ~a - lnp -
oi qi 0 00 q 
ln(y - 1) = R - lna q q 
5 
It is not possible to test directly for R = 0 but it is q 
possible to test if R - lna in equation (4-40) it signi-q q 
A 
ficantly different from -lna as obtained by the ordinary q 
least squares estimator of the logarithm of the production 
function (equation (4-26)). If -lna is not significant-q 
ly different from R - lna , the effect of the institution-q q 
al or traditional constraints, if they exist, does not 
significantly prevent the fishermen from using the optimum 
Combination of inputs. 
5 ~he following demonstration can be conducted with equa-
tion (4-27) or (4-28) the presence of ln(l -y) does not 
affect the reasoning. 
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2 . Test of u . . qi 
Consider the two group s of f irms A and B as defined 
in Section III-I 
Group A i = l s-1 
Group B i = s ..... n 
The first order condition for a firm in group A 
(4-41) lnX . - lnX . + lnp - lnp + ~ a - ln( y-1) 
oi qi 0 q 00 
= R + u . + u . - lna q qi oi q 
i = l . s - l 
for a firm in group B: 
(4-42) lnX . - lnX . + lnp - lnp + ~ a - ln( y - 1) 
oi qi 0 q 00 
= R - lna + u . + u . q q qi oi 
i = s . n 
Where in group A (equation 4-41) or in group B (equation 
4-42 ), the nature of the terms u . is the same and E (u .)=O. 
oi Ol 
Consequently taking the averages over each group of firms 
leads to: 
(4-4 3) lnX . - lnX . + lnp - lnp + ~ a - ln( y - 1) 
oi qi 0 q 00 
= R - lna + u . q q qi 
i = 1 . s-1 
(4-44 ) lnX . - lnX . + lnp - lnp + ~ a - ln( y -1) 
oi qi 0 q 00 
= R - lna + u . q q qi 
i = s • n 
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I n both cases the left hand side of the equations can 
be computed since a is obtained through the estimation 
00 
o f t he production function. Then it is possible to test if 
the r i ght hand sides of the equations are the same. If H : 
0 
(R - lna + u .) = (R - lna + u .)Bis not rejected, q q qi A q q qi 
the two groups of firms do not have significantly different 
p r ice efficiency. 
3. De vis ing statistical tests for price efficiency. 
When testing for the constraints common to all firms 
it is necessary to compare the right hand side of equation 
(4-40), l nX - lnX + lnp + ~ 0oo - lnp - ln(y - 1) oi qi 0 q 
A 
to lna a s q obtained from equation (4-26). 
A prob l e m arises because neither of the terms to be 
compared h a s a normal distribution. In equation (4-26), 
A 
aq, i.e., (a 1 1a 2 ) has a normal distribution but lnaq does 
not. In addition, because of the presence of the term ~a 
00 
the right hand side of equation (4-40) is also not normally 
distributed . Consequently, it is not possible to devise an 
exact s t a tistical test to compare the two estimates. The 
6 
compari son must then rely on the judgment of the researcher. 
On t h e o ther hand, when comparing the price efficiency 
of two g r o ups it is possible to compare . 
6 
Heady and Dillon, Agricultural Production Functions, p.562 
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lnX . - lnX . + lnp - lnp - ~a - ln( y - 1) 
Ol qi 0 q 00 
for each group and to treat a as a constant. Applying 
00 
the central-limit theorem to these expressions, it appears 
that they tend toward a normal distribution. The usual 
test of hypotheses to compare means will then be devised 
and conducted for these estimates. 
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IV The Cost Equation 
Although the difficulties arising when defining the 
cost equation are mainly of a practical nature,one theo-
retical problem deserves attention. It concerns the im-
putation of some costs between various productive activ-
ities. In the present study only trap and hand line fish-
ing are examined. The fishermen however, are sometimes 
involved in other activities requiring the use of some 
of the inputs appearing in the catch function for traps 
and hand lines (as in the case of the boat) . When test-
ing for price efficiency it is essential to find an appro-
priate way to allocate those inputs and their costs between 
the various activities. 
The following example shows how this problem can be 
treated. Consider two production functions: 
al a2 (4-45) xoi = AXll x21 
and 
(4-46) 
using one common input x 1 , the prices are p 0 , p 1 , p 3 , 
and p 4 respectively. 
The 
(4-47) 
profit function 
al a2 
n = poAX11x21 + 
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The first order condition to maximize profit will be, for 
. o TI 
Xl: 
(4-48)---
axl 
or 
(4-49) x 1 = 
P x . 
. 0 01 
= a . 
1 
1 
- p 1 0 
Assume that x1 is a fixed input and that p 1 is the deprecia-
tion. If the equation (4-36) is unknown, one may still want 
to test for price efficiency knowing equation (4-45) and p 4 
x42 . If all the terms of equation (4-49) were known, the 
depreciation could be inputed in the following fashion to 
each of the activities: 
Activity 1 zl = 
alpoXol 
plXl 
z2 
81P4X42 
= 
plXl 
Activity 2 
However, since S is unknown another solution has to be 
proposed. If one assumed that a and S are not very diffe-
rent, that is, that the input elasticity of factor x1 is 
the same 
z = 1 
and 
or nearly the same for Activity 1 and Activity 2. 
poXol 
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z = l 
and 
z = 2 
It appears, in this Chapter, that if it is assumed 
that crowding externalities and mesh externalities are 
negligible, it is possible to use a catch function of 
the Cobb-Douglas type which can be estimated at one point 
in time. However, in order to use ordinary least squares 
for this estimation it is necessary to assume that the 
fishermen maximize the expected profit rather than the 
actual profit. Given this assumption, tests of technical 
efficiency and of price efficiency can be conducted which 
will provide further information concerning the behavior 
of the fishermen. 
V ESTIMATION OF THE 
CATCH FUNCTION 
A Cobb-Douglas type function was chosen as the theo-
retical form of the catch function. The production func-
tion of equation (4-14) suggested that such a form should 
be used. 
x . 
01 
Q 
= A TI 
q=l 
The advantages of using a function of this form for tests 
of efficiency was discussed in Chapter IV. In addition, 
it appeared, a posteriori, that the choice of Cobb-Douglas 
functions was appropriate given the high level of signifi-
cance of the statistical estimators which were obtained with 
such a function. 
The main problem concerning the estimation of the catch 
function is the choice of the variables. This was done on 
the basis of knowledge of the fishing operation and the sta-
tistical significance of the variables. 
The discussion of the choice of variables is presented 
jointly for hand line and trap fishing. 
Two options existed in the choice of the dependent vari-
able. It could have been measured in dollars or in pounds. 
In the following developments the annual catch will be mea-
sured in pounds. The justification for doing so will be 
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given in Section II. The reasons leading to the choice 
of the independent variables are presented in the prece-
ding section. 
101 
I Choice of the Independent Variables 
I Boat and Motor 
It is to be expected that the catch or output of 
either trap or line fishermen will be dependent in some 
way on t he size of the boat and motor used by fishermen. 
The dif f i c ulty is in specifying a variable or set of varia-
bles in units which capture the effects of boat and motor. 
One p o ssibility is to measure the boat and its motor 
in phys i cal terms. The advantage of this is that the fish-
ermen ge nerally gave some accurate measures of the length 
of the b oat and power of the engines. However, to capture 
the speci ficity of a boat and its motor many more variables 
need to be known some of which (like the degree of mainte-
nance) are difficult to evaluate. 
Ano ther problem arises if one chooses physical units. 
A whole s et of variables are available: length of the boat, 
capacity , power of the engine, etc. One suspects at the 
outset t hat they must be highly correlated and consequently 
it is n e cessary to choose one which is representative of the 
boat or t o devise a composite variable which would embody 
most o f t h e characteristics. 
This problem is avoided if the boat and motor are mea-
sured i n monetary terms. This provides a single measurement 
Which captures all the aspects of the input, provided one 
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makes the assumption that the input is homogeneous. This 
choice however also has its drawbacks. Quite often during 
the interviews it appeared that the fishermen had difficul-
ty evaluating the value of their boats. They were asked for 
what price they would sell their boats today without the 
motors. This figure was used as an estimate of the present 
value of the boat. The fishermen also estimated the num-
ber of years remaining in the life of their boats and the 
average life of their motors. This last figure was checked 
with an engine dealer and it appeared that 4 years was the 
average. The prices of the new engines were provided by 
the Administracion de Servicios Agricolas (Puerto Rican 
Department of Agriculture) which has been selling equipment 
to the fishermen for the past ten years. 
For those reasons, a priori, none of the options 
available can be rejected. All are tried in the regressions 
and the results are compared. 
Two monetary measures of capital are introduced: the 
present value of the boat and the motor and also the depre-
ciation measured as: 
(5-1) TD = TB+TE+M 
TD: Total depreciation plus maintenance 
TB: Depreciation on the boat, that is the 
present value of the boat divided by 
the estimate of the remaining years 
of boat's life. 
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TE: Price of the new engine divided by 
4 (estimated average life) . 
M: Annual maintenance on the boat and 
the engine. 
Depreciation on the boat (TB) , depreciation on the 
engine (TE), and maintenance (M) were also used as inde-
pendent variables. 
The length of the boat and the power of the motor are 
also used separetely and concurrently as a measure of this 
input. The various results are presented in Table V-1. 
The regressions in Table V-1 should be read vertically. 
For instance, the first regression in Table V-1-a is: 
( 5-2) LXl = -2.106 + 
(1.113) 
(-1.892) 
+ 0.538 LTT 
(0.147) 
(3.659) 
1.646 
(0.408) 
(4.030) 
LB + 0.729 
(0.171) 
(4.268) 
LH + 0.070 
(0.058) 
(1.206) 
(The first number in parentheses is the standard error of 
the coefficient; the second number is the t-statistic). 
LXl: natural logarithm of the catch from 
traps 
C is the constant term, 
the other terms are natural logarithms of: 
LB: 
LH: 
LV: 
LTT: 
length of the boat 
number of man days at sea during 
the year 
number of gallons of gasoline used 
during the year 
number of traps owned. 
LV 
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TABLE V-1 
COMPARISON OF REGRESSION USING VARIOUS MEASURES 
OF THE BOATS AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS 
(The dependent variable is the annual catch measured in pounds) 
Independent 
variab l es 
constant 
Natural 
l ogarithm of 
Length 
o f boat 
power of 
motor 
man days 
at sea 
gasoline 
used in a 
year 
traps 
owned 
R2 
F( 4,34) 
F(S,23) 
a. Traps. 
Boat 
length 
-2.106 
(1.113) 
(-1.892) 
1.646 
(0.408) 
(4.030) 
0.729 
(0.171) 
(4.268) 
0.070 
(0.058) 
(1.206) 
0.538 
(0.147) 
(3.659) 
0.921 
100.093 
Length Power of 
& power engine 
-1.153 1.650 
(1.326) (0.400) 
(-0.869) (4.117) 
1.187 
(0.538) 
(2.206) 
0.195 0.415 
(0.151) (0.120) 
(1.293) (3.464) 
0.668 0.635 
(0.176) (0.185) 
(3.796) (3.432) 
0.091 0.106 
(0.059) (0.062) 
(1.522) (1.704) 
0.523 0.533 
(0.146) (0.154) 
(3.585) (3.459) 
0.925 0.914 
90.930 
81.995 
The f i r s t number in each group is the coefficient of 
the variable . The first number in parenthesis is the 
standard error and the second number is the t-statistic. 
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TABLE V-1 (continued) 
COMPARISON OF REGRESSION USING VARIOUS MEASURES 
OF THE BOATS AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS 
(The dependent variable is the annual catch measured in pounds.) 
Independent 
variables 
Constant 
Natural 
logarithm of 
total de-
preciation 
depreciation 
on motor 
depreciation 
on boat 
maintenance 
present 
value 
man days 
at sea 
gasoline 
used in a 
Year 
traps 
owned 
R2 
F(4,34) 
F(6,32) 
Capital 
stock 
-1.132 
(1. 065 
(-1.062) 
0.599 
(0.182) 
(3.289) 
0.729 
(0.181) 
(4.016) 
0.081 
(0.062 
(1.314) 
0.411 
(0.165) 
(2.489) 
0.912 
88.371 
a. Traps. 
Depreciation 
0.131 
(0.896) 
(0.146) 
0.462 
(0.186) 
(2.506) 
0.786 
(0.189) 
(4.143) 
0.053 
(0.064) 
(0.822) 
0.433 
(0.176) 
(2.458) 
0.902 
78.568 
Boat Depreciation 
engine depreciation 
maintenance 
3.137 
(1.118) 
(2.803) 
-0.340 
(0.215) 
(-1.578) 
0.157 
(0.078) 
(2.005) 
0.115 
(0.122) 
(0.948) 
0.716 
(0.203) 
(3.528) 
0.059 
(0.067) 
(0.870) 
0.506 
(0.184) 
(3.034) 
0.912 
55.247 
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TABLE V-1 (continued) 
COMPARISON OF REGRESSION USING VARIOUS MEASURES 
OF THE BOATS AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS 
(The dependent variable is the annual catch measured in pounds.) 
Independent 
variables 
Constant 
Natural 
logarithm of 
length 
of boat 
power of 
motor 
man days 
at sea 
gasoline 
used in 
a year 
R2 
F(3-16) 
F(4-15) 
b. lines. 
Boat 
length 
-1. 536 
(1.658) 
(-0.926) 
1. 976 
(0.546) 
(3.619) 
0.716 
(0.085) 
(8.419) 
-0.016 
(0.048) 
(-0.336) 
0.860 
32.779 
Length Power of 
& power ensrine 
-2.758 2.667 
(1.959) (1. 001) 
(-1.408) (2.665) 
2.923 
(0.993) 
(2.943) 
-0.413 0.438 
(0.351) (0.240) 
(-1.175) (1.825) 
0.675 0.728 
(0.111) (0.108) 
(6.068) (6.744) 
-0.026 0.008 
(0.107) (0.060) 
(-0.251) (0.147) 
0.871 0.789 
19.988 
25.378 
The first number in each group is the coefficient of 
the variable. The first number in parenthesis is the 
standard error and the second number is the t-statistic. 
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COMPARISON OF REGRESSION USING VARIOUS MEASURES 
OF THE BOATS AND ITS CHARACTERISTICS 
(The de pendent variable is the annual catch measured in pounds.) 
Independent 
variables 
Constan t 
Natural 
logarithm of 
total 
depreciatio n 
depreciat i o n 
of motor 
depreciatio n 
of boat 
maintenance 
present 
value 
man day s 
at sea 
gasoline 
used i n 
a year 
R2 
F(3-16) 
F(S-14) 
Capital 
stock 
-0.720 
(1.646) 
(-0.437) 
0.688 
(0.218) 
(3.149) 
0.763 
(0.093) 
(8 . 130) 
-0.002 
(0.051) 
(-0.052) 
0.842 
28.613 
b. lines. 
Depreciation 
0.751 
(2.154) 
(0.348) 
0.555 
(0.326) 
(1.703) 
0.776 
(0.121) 
(6.386) 
-0.016 
(0.060) 
(-0.269) 
0.784 
19.420 
Boat depreciation 
engine depreciation 
maintenance 
9.947 
(3.174) 
(3.133) 
-1.140 
(0.464) 
(-2.457) 
0.098 
(0.195) 
(0.501) 
0.032 
(0.192) 
(0.171) 
0.778 
(0.144) 
(5.377) 
-0.069 
(0.122) 
(-0.570) 
0.844 
15.200 
The first number in each group is the coefficient of 
the var i able . The first number in parenthesis is the 
standard error and the second number is the t-statistic. 
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F tests confirm that all the regressionsin Table V-1 
are significant at the 1 percent level 
F(4,34) = 3.93 
F(3,16) = 5.29 
F(5.33) = 3.64 
F(4,15) = 4.89 
F(6,32) = 3.42 
F(5,14) = 4.69 
When the natural logarithm of the length of the boat, 
the power of the motor, the total depreciation or the pre-
sent value are used singly in the regressions their coeff i-
cient is significant at the .05 level with the exception of 
depreciation for hand line operations where the coefficient 
is significant at the .10 level. 
When the natural logarithm of the length of boat and 
of the power of the motor are used concurrently, the coeffi-
cient of the latter is only significant at the .15 level. 
This is due to the high correlation between the two varia-
bles (. 692). 
When using concurrently the two measures of deprecia-
tion (boat and motor) and maintenance, the coefficient of 
the maintenance is always insignificant. This may be due 
to the fact that this variable is correlated with many of 
the others such as the natural logarithm of the depreciation 
on the engine (.465) the natural logarithm of the number of 
man days at sea in a year (.490) and the natural logarithm 
of the number of traps (.632). 
A more disturbing characteristic of the latter regres-
s ion is the negative coefficient of the natural logarithm of 
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the depreciation of the boat. This coefficient is signifi-
cant only at the .15 level for the traps but it is signifi-
cant at the .05 level for the lines. It seems to indicate 
that the more one pays for an engine the less fish one 
catches. This is only an apparent paradox. In the sample 
of fishermen interviewed in Puerto Rico, some had second 
hand Chevrolet engines which cost an average of $340 but 
which are more powerful than the usual outboard motor 
which cost an average of $525. At the same time the fish-
ermen with the powerful engines catch more fish annually 
(an average of 39.822 lbs. versus 7,296 lbs. for the fish-
ermen with less powerful engines). This explanation is 
confirmed when comparing the following regressions: 
( 5-3) 
a) catch from traps for all boats: 
LXl = 3.137 - 0.340 
(1.118) (0.215) 
(2.803) (-1.578) 
LDE + 0.157 
(0.078) 
(2.005) 
LDB + 0.115 LM 
(0.122) 
(0.948) 
+ 0.716 
(0.203) 
(3.528) 
R2 = 0.912 
LH + 0.059 
(0.067) 
(0.870) 
LV + 0.506 
(0.185) 
(3.034) 
LTT 
F statistic (6,32) = 55.247 
The symbols in equation (5-3) represent the natural 
logarithms respectively: 
LXl: 
LDE: 
LDB: 
LM: 
LH: 
LV: 
LTT: 
annual catch from traps in pounds 
depreciation of the motor 
depreciati on of the boat 
maintenance 
number of man days at sea in a year 
number of gallons of gasoline used in a year 
number of traps owned 
( 5-4) 
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b) Catch from traps for the boats with an engine 
less or equal to 40 HP. 
LXl = -0.783 + 0.714 
(1.746) (0.418) 
(-0.448) (1.707) 
LDE + 0.089 
(0.084) 
(1.061) 
LDB - 0.040 LM 
(0.137) 
(-0.292) 
+ 0.586 
(0.202) 
(2.900) 
0.912 
LH + 0.114 
(0.067) 
(1.689) 
LV + 0.566 LTT 
(0.184) 
(3.080) 
F statistic (6.26) = 45.070 
All the symbols are the same as in equation (5-3) 
Equation (5-4) shows that when the influence of the 
boats with powerful motors is removed, the coefficient of 
LDE is positive for the catch from traps. In the case of 
the catch from lines the comparison between equations (5-5) 
and (5-6) shows that when the regression is limited to 
boats which are equipped with an engine of 40 HP. or less 
the coefficient of LDE is not significant. 
( 5-5) 
(5-6) 
c) Catch from lines for all boats: 
LX6 = 9.947 
(3.174) 
(3.133) 
-1.140 
(0.464) 
(-2.457) 
LDE + 0. 098 
(0.195) 
(0.501) 
+ 0. 778 LH 
(0.144) 
- 0.069 LV 
(0.122) 
(-0.570) (5. 377) 
LDB+ 0. 032 LM 
(0.192) 
(0.171) 
0.844 F statistic (5.14) = 15.200 
d) Catch from lines for less powerful boats (40 HP. 
or less). 
LX6 = 10.590 - 0.964 LDE + 0.007 LDB 
(8.149) (1.838) (0.207) 
(1.299) (-0.524) (0.036) 
-0.060 LV + 0.690 LH 
(0.079) (0.140) 
(-0.757) (4.924) 
-0.368 LM 
(0.412) 
(-0.892) 
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R2 = 0.893 F statistic (5.10) = 16.685 
LX6 = natural logarithm of the catch from lines measured in 
pounds. All the other symbols are the same as in equation 
(5-3). 
Aside from the special case just presented, Table V-1 
shows that the coefficient measuring the influence of the 
length of the boat is significantly positive. This is not 
surprising. Bigger and more powerful boats allow the fish-
ermen to go on more distant grounds and, for instance, to 
fish at the edge of the continental shelf which is more 
productive. The larger boats can also fish under rougher 
weather conditions. They can go at sea more often (and this 
will be accounted for in another variable) and they can also 
stay at sea longer. On a given day when the weather becomes 
menacing, the smaller boats have to return sooner. This 
means that they cannot fish a long time with their lines. 
Given the high significance of the regressions, a case 
can be made to use any of them as representative of the fish-
ing operation. Later in this chapter when additional inde-
pendent variables are introduced, the comparison of the re-
sults is made using the regression with the length of the 
boat since it has the highest R2 and F statistics. On the 
other hand, in subsequent chapters, it will be more conve-
nient to use others, particularly when testing for price 
efficiency. However it should be noted that because of the 
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high significance of all the regressions and of their simi-
larity, comparable results could be obtained no matter 
which regression is used. 
II Traps 
The natural logarithm of the number of traps owned 
appears to be an important variable in the explanation of 
the size of the catch. In all the regressions of Table 
V-1-a the coefficient of that variable is highly signifi-
cant, except in the case where it is used in combination 
with the present value of the boat. 
The number of traps in the water would be more appro-
priate. However, the interviews revealed that it was im-
possible to obtain a good estimate of that value from the 
fishermen. The reason is that the number of traps in the 
water varies all the time. Some are lost and not replaced 
immediately; others are pulled out to be repaired. Con-
sequently the fishermen are unable to give an estimate of 
the average number of traps in the water during the year. 
On the other hand, they try to keep constant the number 
of traps they have available. It was thought that probably 
there was a constant relationship between the number of 
traps owned and the number of traps in the water. This 
assumption seems to be confirmed by the significance of the 
coefficient of the logarithm of the .. number of traps owned. 
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Another approach to deal with the effect of the num-
ber of traps on the catch is proposed below although in 
t h is c ase it does not give satisfying results. It attempts 
to take into account the average number of soak days for 
each t rap. Munro found 1 that for a given trap 
( 5 - 7) 
or 
( 5 - 8) 
A term D 
= r C 1 s- r A 
Cs = catch on day s 
r = probability of retention in a trap 
A = daily availability or true rate of 
ingress into a trap 
c Ar 1-r s AD = = s 1-r 
s = number of soak days 
is then introduced into the equation of the 
catch from traps. A being embodied in the constant term 
of the r egression. 
No value of r is available for Puerto Rico but since 
r is f airly constant (between .874 and .901) 2 whatever 
the Caribbean island studied, it was decided to use an 
average r =.884. In addition, the assumption is made 
that t he fishermen go at sea at a constant rythm during 
the y e a r, at least during the months for which catch from 
1 
J.L. Munro. The Mode of Operation of Antillan Fish Traps, 
and the Relationship Between Ingress, Escapement, Catch and 
~· Fisheries Ecology Research Project, (Kingston, Jamaica, 
University of West Indies, Port Royal Marine Laboratory, 
Preprint. 
2~. I P• 16. 
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traps was reported. For instance, if a fisherman had 100 
tickets for 10 months of the year, and no sale tickets for 
the rest of the year, it is assumed that he went fishing 
regularly every three days during those ten months, and 
no t at all the two other months. This could at best be 
an approximation but it is the only way to estimate the 
number of soak days per trap. Personal observation and 
d i scuss ions with the fishermen suggested that no more 
t h a n 60 traps are lifted on an average day. From this, 
the following regression is computed: 
where LXl = natural logarithm of the annual catch in pounds. 
C = constant 
other symbols are the natural logarithm of 
LB 
LH 
LV 
= length of the boat 
= number of man days at sea used in a year 
= number of gallons of gasoline used in a year 
LTT'= maximum number of traps which can be lifted 
TT'= 
LD = 
by one boat in one day 
60 if the fishermen owns more than 60 traps, 
otherwise TT' is the number of traps owned. 
soak factor, such that: 
(5-10) D = .884 (1-.884~) (1-.884 ) 
with 
(5 - ll)S = 30 FM x TT" 60 x Tl 
FM: number of months for which sale tickets reporting 
catch from traps are available. 
Tl: number of sale tickets reporting catch from traps 
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TT" 60 if the fisherman owns less than 60 traps, 
otherwise TT" is the total number of traps 
owned. 
This approach gave unsatisfactory results as shown 
by equation (5-12) . 
(5-12) LXl = 2.254 + 1.158 LB+ 1.304 LH -0.078 
(1.168) (0.414) (0.169) (0.058) 
(1.929) (3.830) (7.715) (-1.338) 
-0.091 LTT' -0.005 LD 
(0.130) (1.147) 
(-0.700) (-0.362) 
0.912 F statistic (5.33) = 68.806 
where 
LXl = nat~ral logarithm of the catch in pounds 
The other symbols are the natural logarithm of 
LB length of the boat 
LH = number of man days at sea in a year 
LV = number of gallons of gasoline used in a year 
LTT'= maximum number of traps which can be lifted by 
one boat in one day 
TT'= 60 if the fisherman owns more than 60 traps, 
otherwise TT' is the number of traps owned 
LD = soak factor 
In this case one would have expected the coefficient of 
the soak factor LD to be close to one; in fact it turned 
out to be insignificant as did the coefficient of LTT'. 
Various explanations are possible. The most obvious one 
is that one or several of the assumptions on which the de-
sign of D is based are too unrealistic. The second set of 
objections to that approach lies in the difference between 
Munro's experiment and the fishermen's practices. Equation 
(5-8) applies to traps which are laid in the same location. 
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on the other hand, if a fisherman owns many traps he will 
put them in quite different areas in order to spread the 
various risks, risk of catching fish of course, but also 
risk of having his traps stolen or lost. Then, this beha-
vior is better accounted for by introducing in the re-
gression a variable which represents the number of traps 
owned as in the regressions of Table V-1-a. 
III Lines 
The number of lines used during a fishing trip is 
introduced as an independent variable to attempt to ex-
plain the catch from lines. Interestingly, it is insigni-
ficant. 
(5-13) LX6 =-1.428 + 1.986 
(l.690) (0.554) 
(-0.845) (3.581) 
-0.323 LL 
(0.447) 
(-0.722) 
LB+ 0.736 
(0.090) 
(8.115) 
LH -0.022 LV 
(0.050) 
(-0.440) 
R2 = 0.864 F statistic (4.15) = 23.981 
LX6 natural logarithm of the catch from lines in 
pounds 
Other symbols are the natural logarithm of 
LB 
LH 
LV 
LL 
= 
= 
= 
= 
length of the boat 
man days at sea 
gallons of gasoline 
lines used each trip 
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This can be explained by examining the composition 
of the sample. Of the 20 fishermen who reported fishing 
with lines, 11 use one line per man in the boat; 6 use 
one line fewer than they have men in the boat; 3 use one 
line more than they have men. Equation (5-13) would indi-
cate that when one man in the boat does not fish but keeps 
the boat steady, the other members of the crew are able 
to catch as much fish as the boats which have the same 
number of men on board but where everyone is fishing. On 
the other hand, when one man attends more than one line he 
is no more efficient than the crew using one line per man. 
Understandably, it is a small sample and it is difficult 
to argue that if the 6 boats using fewer lines than men or 
the 3 boats using more lines than men operated exactly as 
many lines as men they would be more or less efficient. 
Probahly the combination lines-men chosen by each crew 
corresponds to the characteristics of this particular crew, 
and one suspects that the fishermen of each boat chose the 
optimum combination in most cases. 
IV Measuring Labor 
Labor is measured as the number of man days at sea. 
The number of men in the boat is multiplied by the number 
of days the boat went to sea. 
In trap fishing as well as in line fishing, the coeffi-
cient of man days at sea during the year is highly signifi-
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cant. This is not surprising since the dependent varia-
ble is the annual catch. However, where the daily catch 
is used as the dependent variable and the number of men 
in the boat is the measure of labor input the coefficient 
of the latter variable is significant for traps but not 
f o r hand lines as shown by equations (5-14) and (5-15). 
(5-14) DLXl= -2.489 + 1.720 LB+ 0.587 LHD 
(1.143) (0.417) (0.261) 
(-2.176) (4.118) (2.224) 
+ 0.009 LVD + 0.413 LTT 
(0.048) (0.101) 
(0.198) (4.080) 
2 R = 0.699 F statistic ( 4. 34) = 19. 819 
The symbols are the natural logarithms of: 
DLXl 
LB 
LHD 
LVD 
LTT 
= daily catch from traps 
= length of the boat 
= men in the boat for each trip 
= gallons of gasoline per trip 
traps owned 
( 5-15) DLX = -2.866 + 2.401 LB 
(1.742) (0.592) 
(-1.644) (4.052) 
-0.518 LHD 
(0.449) 
(-1.153) 
R2 = 0.520 
t . 15 = 1.071 
-0.043 LVD 
(0.054) 
(-0.805) 
F statistic (3-16) 
F.Ol (3-16) = 5.29 
DLX6= daily catch from lines 
5.799 
One would expect the number of men in the boat to be 
a significant explanatory variable as far as catch from 
traps are concerned. Having two men instead of one will 
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allow the placing of more traps in deeper water since 
it will be easier for two men rather than just for one 
to pull the traps. When the effects of using a pot hau-
ler are investigated in the next chapter, it will be shown 
that being able to pull the traps from deeper water is an 
important factor. 
As far as line fishing is concerned, the coefficient 
of the labor variable would tend to be negative although 
it is significant only at the 15% level. This suggests 
that given a fixed number of lines, having an extra man 
to keep the boat still is not productive. This already 
appeared in equation (5-13) where it was shown that given 
a fixed number of men in the boat it was just as produc-
tive to have everyone attend a line. However, the same 
caution is necessary here concerning the size and the 
structure of the sample. 
V Role of the Fishing Grounds 
No direct attempt was made to determine the effect on 
the catch from fishing in the various fishing grounds. Du-
ring the field interviews it appeared that the fishermen 
often changed fishing grounds. In. addition, they were rare-
ly able (or willing) to state with precision where they 
fished. For these reasons another approach was substituted: 
The fishermen were asked how many gallons of gasoline they 
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used on each trip, on the average. This was expected to 
give an indication as to how far from their home port they 
went fishing. Since the dependent variable is the yearly 
catch, the number of gallons of gasoline used on each 
trip has been multiplied by the number of trips. As shown 
in Table V-1 the coefficient of that variable is not signi-
ficant for trap fishing only at low degrees of confidence. 
One of the reasons f or this comes from the difficulty for 
the fishermen to give an accurate measure of the number of 
gallons of gasoline used during one trip . During many in-
terviews it seemed that the fishermen did not have a good 
idea of this figure. Futhermore, discussions with a boat 
dealer showed that, given a 16-foot boat of the type used 
in Puerto Rico, a 6 HP. motor would consume 1 to 1/2 gallons 
of gasoline in one hour at 4 .5 mph. while an 18 HP. motor 
would consume 2 to 2-1/2 gallons in one hour at 10 mph . 
In other words, to go the same distance, the two motors 
would use the same amount of gasoline providing that the 
boat with a small motor goes at half the speed of the other 
boat. And even if they go the same distance at the same 
speed the difference in consumption of gasoline is likely . 
to be small. This suggests that it is not such a good varia-
ble to estimate how far the fishermen g o fishing. In addi-
tion, the small amount of gasoline involved explains why the 
fishermen could not give a value which was precise enough 
to be significant in the reg ression . 
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Another variable was then introduced. Instead of 
using the number of gallons of gasoline, the average num-
ber of hours of a fishing trip was selected. It was then 
multiplied by the number of days at sea, giving the total 
time spent at sea in a year; the coefficient of the na-
tural logarithm of this value is revealed to be significant. 
(5-16) LXl = -1.989 + 1.365 LB+ 0.457 LH + 0.482 LI 
(1.057) (0.399) (0.211) (0.206) 
(-1.881) (3.417) (2.163) (2.337) 
+ 0.392 LTT 
(0.141) 
(2.773) 
2 R = 0.929 F statistic (4,34) = 112.375 
(5-17) LX6 = -1.445 + 1.833 LB + 0.577 LH + 0.160 LI 
(1.456) (0.482) (0.085) (0.072) 
(-0.992) (3.800) (6.785) (2.208) 
R2 = 0.892 F statistic (3,16) = 44.042 
When the daily catch was the dependent variable and 
LID the natural logarithm of the daily length of the trip 
the following results are obtained: 
(5-18) DLXl = -2.197 + 1.446 
(1.085) (0.415) 
(-2.025) (3.482) 
LB + 0.331 LHD 
(0.275) 
(1.201) 
+ 0.444 LID + 0.356 LTT 
(0.213) (0.095) 
(2.079) (3.757) 
2 R = 0.733 F statistic (4,34) = 23.384 
(5-19) DLX6 = -2.683 + 2.119 LB + 0.237 LID-0.237 LID 
(1.745) (0.651) (0.276) (0.476) 
(-1.537) (3.256) (0.857) (-:0.708) 
0.523 F statistic (3.16) = 5.857 
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In equations (5-16) to (5-19)the symbols represent: 
1) Dependent variables, the natural logarithm of 
LXl 
DLXl 
LX6 
DLX6 
annual catch from traps 
daily catch from traps 
annual catch from lines 
daily catch from lines 
2) Independent variables, the natural logarithm of 
LB length of the boat 
LH man days at sea in a year 
LI total time spent at sea in a year 
LTT traps owned 
LHD men in the boat for each trip 
LID length of the daily trip (in hours) 
In this case the daily catch from traps is signif i-
cantly altered by the time spent at sea each day, independ-
ent of the number of traps owned. This suggests that the 
fishermen who spend the longest time at sea every day pro-
bably do so in order to reach more productive grounds, 
either to the edge of the continental shelf or along the 
coast but further from their port. 
On the other hand, it is surprising to note that the 
time spent fishing with hand lines does not help explain 
the catch. This phenomenon is to be paralleled with the 
observation that many of the coefficients of other 
variables which could be expected to influence the catch 
were also not significant. 2 In fact, the R 's and F 
statistics for the regressions dealing with the catch 
2 from hand lines were constantly lower than the R 's 
and F statistics for the regressions dealing with the 
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catch from traps. These findings tend to emphasize a 
characteristic of hand line fishing, that is, the 
higher skill required from the fishermen. When trap 
fishing and hand line fishing were described earlier it 
was mentioned that to be a successful hand line fisher-
man required that the fisherman have a knowledge of 
fish behavior and their feeding habits. This is not as 
important in trap fishing although it will be shown later 
that the skill factor can also make a difference in the 
catch from traps. However, since no measure of the 
fishermen's skill was introduced in the regression, if 
it is an important factor in determining the catch, the 
absence of this variable would explain the low R21 s and 
F statistics as well as the lack of significance of the 
coefficients of the other variables. Subsequent find-
ings will be presented which tend to confirm this hy-
pothesis. 
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II The Dependent Variable 
Both trap and hand line fishing produce a mixed 
species catch, in the case of traps primarily bottom 
species and for hand lines bottom and midwater species. 
Although some species are more valuable than others, there 
is little or no opportunity for the fishermen to selecti-
vely fish, using these two techniques, for the higher 
priced species. 
On the contrary, if there are changes in the prices 
from one port to another, their effects will be eliminated 
by measuring the catch in pounds. In fact, those varia-
tions are very small and the regressions are quite compara-
ble whatever the unit in which the catch is measured. Those 
regressions are shown in Table V-2. 
To conclude this chapter it is necessary to make a 
remark concerning the missing sale tickets. 
The Puerto Rican Department of Agriculture assumes 
that the missing sale tickets represent 25 percent of the 
fishermen's trips but also 25 percent of their catch. Re-
gressions were computed after the catch and the number of 
days at sea had been divided by .75. The effect of this 
transformation is to change the constant term as it can be 
shown in a simple example. 
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TABLE V-2 
COMPARISONS OF REGRESSIONS USING POUNDS AND DOLLARS 
TO MEASURE THE CATCH. 
Traps Lines 
pounds dollars pounds dollars 
Constant -2.106 -2.545 -1.536 -1. 701 
(1.113 (1.070) (1.658) (0.806) 
(-1.892) (-2.377) (-0.926) (-1. 991 
Natura l 
logari thm of 
length 1. 646 1. 550 1.976 1. 805 
of the (0.408) (0.392) (0.546) (0.496) 
boat (4.030) (3.947) (3.619) (3.639) 
man day s 0.729 1. 053 0.716 0.748 
at sea (0.171) (0.164) (0.085) (0.077) 
(4.268) (6.407) (8.419) (9.679) 
gallon s 0 . 070 -0.042 -0.016 -0.005 
of (0.058) (0.055) (0.048) (0.044) 
gasolin e (1.206) (-0.754) (-0.336) (-0.126) 
traps 0.538 0.253 
owned (0.147) (0.141) 
(3.659) (1.792) 
R2 0.921 0.918 0.860 0.891 
F(4,3 4 } 100.093 95.871 
F(3,16) 32.779 43.593 
The first number in each group is the coefficient of the 
variable . The first number in parenthesis is the standard 
error and the second is the t-statistic. 
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Given a Cobb-Douglas type production function: 
If some of the variables (the catch and those which are a 
multiple of the number of trips) are multiplied (or divided) 
by a constant c. 
Table V-3 shows the change in the constant term of the 
regression when adjustments are introduced for the missing 
sale tickets. 
In fact, the constant term is only slightly changed; 
this is because the sum of the coefficients of LH and LV is 
close to one. LH and LV are the independent variables which 
were divided by .75 to adjust for the missing sale tickets. 
This chapter shows that the boat and its motor are the 
most important factors to explain the level of the catch from 
hand lines and from traps. The second significant indepen-
dent variable is the number of man days at sea. In fact, 
those two elements are the only ones which were found to 
be significant to explain the catch from lines. To explain 
the catch from traps, the number of traps owned is also 
an important explanatory variable. 
Among the variables which might have been important 
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TABLE V- 3 
CHANGES IN THE CONSTANT TERM OF THE REGRESSION 
CORRECTED FOR THE MISSING SALE TICKETS. 
(Catch in pounds.) 
c 
Natur al 
logarithm of 
length o f 
boat 
man day s 
at sea 
gallons o f 
gasoline 
traps 
owned 
R2 
F(4,34) 
F(3,16) 
Traps Lines 
Before ;:,fter Before After 
adjustment adjustment adjustment adjustment 
- 2 . 106 -2.049 -1. 536 -1. 450 
(1.113) (1.113) (1.658) (1.664) 
(-1.892) (-1.839) (-0.926) (-0 . 871) 
(The coefficients of the other variables are 
the same before and after adjustment.) 
1. 646 
(0.408) 
(4.030) 
0 . 729 
(0.171) 
(4.268) 
0.070 
(0.058) 
(1.206) 
0.538 
(0 . 147) 
(3.659) 
0 . 921 
100.093 
1. 976 
(0.546) 
(3.619) 
0.716 
(0 . 085) 
(8.419) 
-0 . 016 
(0.048) 
(-0.336) 
0.860 
32 . 779 
The first number in each group is the coefficient of 
the variable . The first number in parenthesis is the 
standar d error and the second number is the t-statistic. 
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it must be noted that the number of gallons of gasoline 
used in a year is not a good explanatory variable. 
It is also interesting to recall the conclusion con-
cerning the rumber of men in the boat. For trap fishing, 
it was found that, everything else being equal, there was 
a positive correlation between the number of men in the 
boat and the size of the catch, however, for line fishing, 
the number of men in the boat does not affect the catch. 
Despite the various problems encountered in defining 
and measuring several of the inputs, the results of the 
regression are, in general, very significant, and they 
provide a useful basis forfurther analysis of the fisher-
men's behavior. 
VI TESTS OF EFFICIENCY 
Having estimated the catch functions for traps and 
hand lines it is now possible to test for technical and 
price efficiency. For technical efficiency the test is 
conducted as described in Chapter IV. A dummy variable 
is introduced to measure the technical efficiency of one 
group of boats as compared to the technical efficiency 
of another. Tests of price efficiency and comparisonsare 
then conducted for the entire sample of fishermen, and 
for various groups. Finally a test is conducted to de-
termine if, given the present level of the other inputs, 
it is profitable to invest in a winch. 
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I Technical Efficiency 
The technical efficiency tests are based on the assurnp-
tion that for the same fishing methods all the boats have 
the same catch function e x cept for one parameter which em-
bodies the difference in technical efficiency. 
The catch function has the general form 
n 
( 6-1) LXl = c + cS s + L: a.LX. 
i=l ]_ ]_ 
LXl natural logarithm of the catch 
LX. natural logarithm of input level x. ]_ ]_ 
Dummy variable: 
s = 1 i = 1 ..... s 
s = 0 i = s -1 ..... n 
For this test the catch functions used were the same 
as those described in Chapter V. 
Various criteria were used to divide the sample of 
boats in two groups, then, technical efficiency was com-
pared between groups. 
Division I: (1) motor less than or equal to 30 hp 
( 2) motor over 30 hp. 
Division II: ( 1) motor less than or equal to 40 hp 
( 2) motor over 40 hp. 
Division III: (1) fishermen using a winch 
( 2) fishermen not using a winch 
Division IV: ( 1) fishermen fishing with traps only 
( 2) fishermen fishing with lines and traps 
Division V: ( 1) fishermen fishing with lines only 
( 2) fishermen fishing with lines and traps 
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For each division a regression was computed where the 
dependent variable was the annual catch, while the indepen-
dent variables . were, 
( 1) for the trap fishing operations: 
(a) the length of the boat 
(b) the number of man-days at sea 
(c) the number of gallons of gasoline used in 
one year 
( d) the number of traps owned 
( 2) for the line fishing operations: 
(a) the length of the boat 
(b) the number of man days at sea 
(c) the number of gallons of gasoline used in 
a year 
In addition in each regression a dummy variable was 
introduced such that: 
First regression, Division I: 
S - 0 if motor < · 30 HP 
S = 1 if motor > 30 HP 
Second regression, Division II: 
S - 0 if motor < 40 HP 
S - 1 if motor > 40 HP 
Third regression, Division III: 
S = 0 if the boat is not equipped with a winch 
S = 1 if the boat is equipped with a winch 
Fourth regression, Division IV: 
S - 0 if the fishermen fish with traps only 
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S = 1 if the fishermen fish with traps and hand lines 
Fifth regression, Division V: 
S = 0 if the fishermen fish with lines only 
S - 1 if the fishermen fish with traps and lines. 
The coefficient of S obtained in the successive regression 
is presented in Table VI-1. 
Division 
Division 
Division 
Division 
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TABLE VI-1 
TESTS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
(Using the length of the boat 
as an independent variable.) 
Trap 
fishing 
I motor > 30 hp 0.103 
(0.278) 
motor < 30 hp (0.371) 
II motor > 40 hp 0.154 
(0.394) 
motor < 40 hp (0. 391) 
III boats equipped 0.476 
with a winch (0.217) 
boats without a (2.196) 
winch 
IV and Division v 
fishermen fishing 0.565 1 
with traps and (0.213) 
lines (2.647) 
Line 
fishing 
0.771 
(0.712) 
(0.999) 
0.317 
(0.725) 
(0.437) 
0.011 2 
(0.546) 
(0.021) 
1 Compared to the fishermen fishing with traps only. 
2 Compared to the fishermen fishing with hand lines only. 
The first number in each group is the coefficient of 
the dummy variable. The first number in parenthesis is 
the standard error and the second number is the t-sta-
tistic. 
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I Big Boats and Small Boats 
The first important finding is the non-significance 
of the coefficient of the dummy variable for powerful 
boats. This is the case for fishermen using either traps 
or hand lines. It is also true whether the boats are 
divided on the basis of motors more or less powerful than 
30HP or more or less powerful than 40HP. This means that 
there is no significant difference between the technical 
ability of the captains of big boats and the technical 
ability of the captains of small boats. As shown in Chap-
ter V the size of the boat is an important factor to ex-
plain the size of the catch but what Table VI-1 indica-
tes is that, given the same equipment, the captains of 
big boats will have the same catch as the captains of 
small boats. 
II Traps and Lines as a Combined Enterprise 
On the other hand, this is not the case if the trap 
fishermen are divided between those fishing with traps 
only and those fishing with both traps and lines. The 
fishermen practicing both methods are on the average more 
technically efficient than the fishermen using traps only. 
In the preceding chapter it was suggested that skill could 
be an important element in explaining the catch from lines. 
This is now reinforced by the estimates given in Table 
VI-1. This shows that, all other inputs being equal, the 
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fishermen who fish with lines and traps catch more fish 
in their traps. This is not a surprising finding. It 
is usually recognized that line fishing requires better 
knowledge of fish behavior. In this study it appears 
that the fishermen who have this knowledge use it to im-
prove the catch from traps. It is not possible to tell 
if this knowledge is acquired through the practice of line 
fishing or if the fishermen decide to fish with lines be-
cause they already know the fish's behavior. Whatever the 
answer, this result emphasizes the importance of the skill 
as an input factor. Everything else being equal, the fish-
ermen using both traps and lines, on the average, catch 
77 percent more than the fishermen using traps only. 
When the line fishermen are divided into two groups, 
those using lines only and those using lines and traps, it 
appears that there is no significant difference of skill 
between those groups. This means that trap fishing does 
not require any special knowledge nor does it teach any-
thing that is not already necessary for line fishing. 
III Efficiency of a Winch 
If the trap fishermen are divided between those using 
a winch and those using a winch, Table VI-1 shows that the 
coefficient of the dummy variable representing the winch is 
significantly positive. However, the coefficient of the 
dummy variable is more difficult to interpret. To a large 
extent it measure s t h e e ffects of the winch itsel f . 
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Yet it is conceivable that some fishermen decided to buy 
a winch because they had chosen to fish in more produc-
tive and deeper grounds. If this is so the coefficient 
of the dummy variable reflects both the effects of the 
winch and the technical efficiency of the captains. For 
these reasons it is not surprising to find that using a 
winch makes a significant difference in the catch (61 per-
cent) . In Chapter V it was shown that the number of men 
in the boat was significant, that is, the more power there 
was to pull the traps, the larger the catch. The positive 
coefficient of the dummy variable associated with the 
winch confirms this finding. The fishermen using pot hau-
lers can lay the traps at greater depths. This gives them a 
larger choice of fishing grounds and therefore they can 
fish the more profitable deeper waters. 
Despite the fact that the use of a winch makes a si-
gnificant difference, this does not mean that it is pro-
fitable to own one. The added cost may not be compensated 
by the increase in the catch. This will be tested in the 
last section. 
In addition, the last criteria can be used in combina-
tion to account at the same time for the fishermen who fish 
with traps and lines as well as for the fishermen who use 
a winch. In this case the following regression was obtained. 
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( 6-3) LPRl = -1.285 + 0.395 Q + 0.274 W + 0.793 LB +l.190 LH 
(0.206) (0.206) (0.156) (0.156) 
(l.916) (l.384) (7.622) (7.622) 
-0.077 LV + 0.332 LTT 
(0.055) (0.139) 
(-1.399) (2.394) 
2 R = 0.929 F statistic (6,32) = 68.288 
8 = 0.4738 
00 
LP Rl = natural logarithm of the total revenue from traps 
(in dollars) 
Q = l 
Q =O 
w =l 
w =0 
when 
when 
when 
when 
the fisherman fishes with traps and lines 
the fisherman fishes with traps only 
the boat is equipped with a winch 
the boat is not equipped with a winch 
The other variables are the natural logarithm of 
LB = length of the boat 
LH = number of man days at sea in a year 
LV = number of gallons of gasoline used in a year 
LTT = number of traps owned 
Equati on ( 6-3) shows that, even when measured concurrently, 
the e ffects of fishing with traps and lines and using a 
winch can alter the regression equation. However in this 
case the effect of the winch is not as important as before. 
This tends to confirm that, in fact, when the efficiency 
of us ing a winch is tested independently, two elements 
are measured, the effect of the winch itself and the cap-
tain's efficiency. Here the captain's efficiency is already 
partly embodied in Q. 
B) Test of technical efficiency when the input boat-
motor i s measured in monetary terms. 
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The ave rage power of the boat, the average price of a 
horsepower and the value of the dummy variable when the 
present value of the boat and of the motor is used to 
measure the combined input boat-motor are shown in Table 
VI-2. 
The technical efficiencies which were proven to be 
significantly different earlier are confirmed to be so in 
Table VI- 2 . But a significant difference between more 
powerful b oats and less powerful boats appears here. It 
means t hat everything else being equal, per dollar of pre-
sent valu e of boat and motor, the captains of the big boats 
catch more fish. This can be explained when comparing the 
average cos t of one horsepower for each group. The cap-
tains o f the mo re powerful boats get more power per dollar 
than do t h e captains of the less powerful boats. For this 
reason, f or the same value of boat and motor they have a 
bigger cat ch, since there is a positive correlation between 
catch and p ower (See Table V-1) . 
In this case, the dummy variable does not measure 
fishing ability, it is only an effect of the cost structure. 
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TABLE VI-2 
TESTS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
(Us ing the Present Value of the Boat and 
the Motor as an Independent Variable) 
DIVISION I 
motor > 3 0 HP 
motor < 3 0 HP 
DIVISION II 
motor > 4 0 HP 
motor < 4 O HP 
DIVISION III 
boats with winch 
· boa ts without winch 
DIVISION IV and 
DIVISION V 
fisherme n fishing 
with trap s & lines 
Average 
power of 
the motor 
In HP 
60.42 
15.26 
80.83 
19 . 76 
50.82 
19.65 
47 . 90 
Trap Fishing 
Average 
price of 
one hp. 
In $ 
11 . 79 
38.79 
4 . 84 
35 . 15 
21. 31 
34 . 25 
16.76 
Dummy 
variable 
0.418 
co. 263 l 
Cl.590} 
0.687 
. -0.277 
(2. 4 7 6 l 
0.698 
co .19 5) 
(3.579) 
0.630 1 
(0.2161 
(2.913) 
--------------------------------------------------------------
fishermen f ishing 
with t r a ps only 
f is~ermen fishing 
with lines only 
22.60 34.95 
l 
Compared to fishermen fishing with traps only. 
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TABLE VI-2 (continued) 
TESTS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY 
(Using the Present Value of the Boat and 
the Motor as an Independent Variable) 
DIVISION I 
motor > 30 HP 
motor < 30 HP 
DIVISION II 
motor > 40 HP 
motor < 40 HP 
DIVISION III 
boats with winch 
boats without winch 
DIVISION IV and 
DIVISION V 
fishermen fishing 
with traps & lines 
Average 
power of 
the motor 
In HP 
75.2 
19.00 
84.00 
20.31 
47.90 
Line Fishing 
Average 
price of 
one hp. 
In $ 
5.65 
31.28 
2.38 
36.49 
16.76 
Dummy 
variable 
1. 4 37 
( 0 . 4 51) 
(3.185) 
1. 658 
(_0.501) 
(3. 3 0 5) 
0.604 2 
(_0.6131 
(0.985) 
--------------------~------------------------~~---------------
fishermen fishing 
with traps only 
fishermen fishing 
with lines only 
2 
18.36 32.48 
Compared to fishermen fishing with lines only. 
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II Price Efficiency 
In this section, tests are conducted to determine if 
the fishermen are price efficient, that is to see if they 
choose the optimum combinations of inputs, given the set 
of prices and the technical coefficients: 
Equation (4-40) gave: 
n 
l/n E (ln X . - ln X .)+ln p -ln p - 1/28 +ln 3/2=R i=l qi oi o q oo 
+ ln a 
As mentioned in Ch~pter IV , because of the statis-
tical distribution of the left hand side of equation (4-40) 
as well as of log (a ) it was not possible to conduct a q 
statistical test to compare those two terms. For this 
reason some caution will be necessary when interpreting 
the results. 
I Trap Fishing 
a) Price efficiency of the investment in the boat 
and the motor. 
When testing for the price efficiency of investment 
in boat and motor for the 39 fishermen fishing with traps 
equation (4-40) becomes: 
39 
1/39 E {-lnX .+lnB . -lnp +lnpB}-1/28 +ln(y-1)= 
i=l oi i o oo 
(6-4) 
Where each symbol is 
X0 i catch in pounds 
Bi length of the boat 
P0 price of a pound of fish 
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PB price of one foot of boat 
8 standard error of the regression using the same 
00 
variables 
y crew's share under the lay system 
RB disturbance term accounting for possible price 
inefficiency 
a B coefficient of lnB in the regression 
Note that: 
LX . +lnp = LPRl. Ol 0 l 
where PRl is the total catch in dollars 
and 
lnBi + lnpB is the cost of the boat. 
Consequently it is possible to write equation (6-4); 
3S 
( 6-5) 
LPRI . 
l 
LDT. 
l 
1/39 E (LDT. - LPR1 1 ) - 1/2 6 + ln (3/2) . 1 l 00 i-
natural logarithm of the total revenue from 
trap fishing 
natural logarithm of the depreciation of the 
boat and motor plus maintenance imputed to 
trap fishing: 
This share DT for trap fishing is equal to: 
DT=TDlxZl 
TD total depreciation on the boat and motor plus 
maintenance 
Zl proportion of the total revenue stemming from traps 
Computing equation (6-5) 
39 
(6-5a) 1/39 E 
gives: 
(LDT i-LPRl) -1/2 0 
00 
+ ln ( 3/2) =1.1778 
i=l 
Where 0
00 
is the standard error in the regression (6-6). 
Total for price efficiency, the value of equation 
(6-5a) must be compared to the coefficient of LDT in equation 
(6-6). 
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(6-6) LPRl = -4.357 + 0.366 LTD + 1.146 LH + 0.110 LTT 
(0.756) (0.168) (0.151) (0.057) 
(-5.759) (2.174) (7.582) (2.747) 
-0.058 LV + 0.398 Q + 0.435 w 
(0.052) (0. 221) (0.185) 
(-1.112) (1.797) (2.344) 
The symbols are the same as in equation ( 6- 3) 
The value of equation (6-5a): -1.177 is to be com-
pared with ln(0.366) = -1.005. In this case the difference 
between the two values is small and does not allow the con-
clusion that the fishermen are not price efficient. 
b) Price efficiency of the investment in traps 
To test if the fishermen are using the right number of 
traps given their present level of the other inputs, the 
following analysis was conducted. 
1 (6-7) -39 
39 
l: 
i=l 
(LTT . - LPRl.) + ln (20)+ ln(3/2) = 
1. 1. 
-0.970 
(1.266) 
$20.00 is the expected cost of a trap. The price of a 
trap is $16. On the whole island the fishermen lose 1/4 of 
their traps every year. For this reason the annual cost 
of owning for instance, 100 traps is 100 x 16 5 x - = 100 4 
x 20 = $2000. (from equation (6-7) and using 8 = .0532 
00 
(from equation 6-6). An important note should be added 
concerning the price of the traps. Most of the fishermen 
presently use steel framed traps. They usually buy the 
frame already made and put the chicken wire around it them-
selves. In that case the material costs them $16. Using 
144 
mangrove framed traps, the material is cheaper. However, 
the life of a mangrove framed trap is shorter than the 
life of a steel framed one. Consequently, it is reason-
able to estimate the expected annual cost of a trap at 
$20. regardless of the type of frame. 
39 
( 6-8) 1 l: (_LTT. - LPR . }_ + ln c20 )_ - 1/28 +ln(_3/2) = 39 i=l l l. 00 
-0.513 
This is to be compared with the natural logarithm of the 
coefficient of LTT in equation (6-6) ln (0.110) = -2.227. 
The difference between those two numbers is sufficiently 
large to conclude that, given the present level of the other 
inputs, the fishermen are investing too much in traps. 
II Line Fishing 
In this case the test of price efficiency was conduc-
ted for the input boat-motor only. None of the other in-
puts, except labor, had a significant regression coeffi-
cient. 
(6-9) 
For this test the following regression was used: 
LPR6= 4.689+ 0.578 LDL+ 
(1.925) (0.288) 
(2.435) (2.0011 
0.816 LH - 0.007 LV 
(0.107) (0.053) 
(7 .586) (-0.131) 
2 
R = 0.840 F(3,16) = 28.131 8 = 0.527 
00 
Where LPR6 is the natural logarithm of the total revenue 
from lines. The cost of capital was computed in the same 
fashion as for trap fishing. 
(6-10) DL = TDxZ2 
DL depreciation on the boat and the motor, plus main-
tenance imputed to line fishing. 
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TD total depreciation on the boat and the motor 
plus maintenance. 
It was noted in Chapter IV that this motor of im-
puting cost was acceptable if the coefficients of capital 
in the regressions were similar. This is almost the 
situation since for trap fishing the capital coefficient 
is 0.366 while for hand line fishing it is 0.578. 
From equation (6-9) ln (0.578) = -0.548, which 
is to be compared with: 
( 6-11) 1 20 
20 
L: 
i=l 
(ln DL -ln PR6) -1/2 8 +ln(3/2) = -1.679 
00 
In this case the difference between the two values 
seems large enough to conclude safely that, given the pre-
sent level of other inputs, the fishermen would increase 
their profit if they had larger boats. 
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III Comparison of the Price Efficiencies for Various 
Groups of Fishermen 
The fishermen were divided into groups according 
to power of the motor, presence of a winch and those 
using one method of fishing only compared to those fish-
ing with both traps and lines. 
For each division the following relationship was 
computed: 
I) For trap fishing 
A) Input boat-motor 
(6-12) 1 
n 
n 
l: 
i=l 
(ln DT. - ln PRl.) 
l l 
B) and traps 
n 
-1/28 + ln(3/2) =6T 
00 
(6-;L3); l: 
i=l 
(ln DT. - ln PRl.) -1/28 + ln(3/2) 
1 l 00 
II) For line fishing 
( 6-14 ) 
Input boat-motor 
1 n 
l: 
n i=l 
(ln DL. - ln PRl.) -1/28 + ln(3/2) = 6L 
l l 00 
The result of those computations are summarized in 
Table VI-3. 
In Division IV the sample is divided between those 
using both traps and lines and those using traps only. 
In Division V, fishermen using both traps and lines are 
compared to those fishing with lines only. The analysis 
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TABLE VI-3 
COMPARISON OF PRICE EFFICIENCY BETWEEN GROUPS 
OF FISHERMEN. 
Trap Fishing Line Fishing 
Boat-motors Traps Boat-motors 
lna. = -1.005 lna. = -1. 099 lna. = -0.5481 
8T <P 8L 
DIVISION I 
motors > 30 hp -1. 622 - .968 -2.328 
(0.559) (1.132) (0.520) 
motors < 30 hp -0.972 -0.303 -1. 462 
(1.007) (1.010) (0.903) 
DIVISION II 
motors >40 hp -2.005 -1.588 -2.683 
(0. 383) (0.334) (0.156) 
motors < 40 hp -1.022 -0.311 -1.460 
(0.927) (1.054) (0.873) 
DIVISION III 
boats with -1.666 -1.043 
winch (0.668) (0.861) 
bosts without 1.009 -0.313 
winch (0.958) (1.083) 
DIVISION IV & V 
Traps and lines -1.331 -0.820 -1. 708 
(1.060) (1.236) (0.943 
Traps only -1.136 -0.431 
(0.912) (1.044) 
Lines only -1. 682 
(0.860) 
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of price efficiency is between groups within divisions 
by computing T, L and ~ (Table VI -3) as shown in equa-
tions (6-12), (6-13), (6-14). 
Tests of hypothesis were conducted for T, L and ~ 
in each division. Treating 1/2 as a constant, according 
00 
to the central limit theorem, the left hand sides of equa-
tions (6-12), (6-13) and (6-14) have a distribution which 
tends to be normal. 
Null hypothesis H : 
0 
Alternative hypothesis H1 : 
(6-15) 
8 
00 
where 
xl average of sample 1 
x2 average of sample 2 
nl size of sample 1 
n2 size of sample 2 
82 = nl sl + n2 s2 
00 
nl n2 -2 + 
82 
1 variance of sample 1 
82 
2 variance of sample 2 
with n1+n 2-2 degrees of freedom 
Table VI-4 summarizes the results of the tests. 
Division 
Division 
Division 
Division 
Division 
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TABLE VI-4 
t-TESTS FOR COMPARING PRICE EFFICIENCY 
AMONG GROUPS OF FISnERMEN. 
Trap Fishing Line Fishing 
Boats Traps Boats 
t of GT t of ¢ to of eL 
I 2.039 1.779 1.888 
II 2.490 2.812 2.720* 
III 1.846 1.949 
IV 0.524 0.936 
v 0.061 
*reject null hypothesis at the 2.5% level. 
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If 2.5 percent is chosen as the risk of type I error 
the null hypothesis is rejected for the values of t mark-
ed (*). At the 5 percent level the null hypothesis is al-
ways rejected except for groups IV and V. This indicates 
that the fishermen in the various groups behave quite 
differently. 
a) Comparison between the levels of investment in 
boat-motor. 
Both in Divisions I and II the owners of small boats 
seem to be more efficient when they invest in boat and 
motor regardless of whether they fish with traps or with 
lines. This is an apparent conflict with the conclusions 
of Section I. 
In fact it is another effect of the cost structure 
which was presented earlier in Table VI-2. An example 
will explain the present situation. A fishermen using 
an outboard motor of 40 hp may have invested too much 
because such a motor cost him $900. On the other hand, 
a fisherman using a used inboard motor of 80 hp may 
not have invested enough because such a motor cost him only 
$200. In such a case it may appear that the fishermen of 
the big boats do not invest too much. At the same time, 
it is possible that, when all the fishermen are included 
into one sample, the results show that more investment 
should be undertaken. In the extreme example proposed 
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above this would suggest that the fishermen should invest 
in p owerful inboard motors because they can buy them at 
re latively lower prices. 
b) Comparison between the levels of investment in 
t raps. 
In Table VI-4 it is also shown that there is a signi-
ficant difference between the price efficiency of the owners 
of s mall boats when they invest in traps. Earlier it was 
found that, as a whole, the fishermen had a tendency to have 
too many traps but, as it appears now, this varies conside-
rably among the groups within divisions. In Table VI-3 
it appears that the owners of boats with an engine over 30 
hp are price efficient, while if the sub-group is limited 
to the fishermen who have a boat with a motor over 40 hp 
there is even a tendency to have too few traps. This si-
gnificant difference between the positions of the various 
groups o f fishermen is probably due to the fact that the 
fishermen tend to fix the number of their traps according 
to the c ommon amount of traps owned by the other fisher-
men i n their community rather than according to their real 
needs. 
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IV Investing in an Winch 
When testing for the technical efficiency of a winch 
the catch function for firm i had the form: 
s = 1 if the fisherman used a winch 
s = 0 if the fisherman did not use a winch 
u 
(6-17) Xl. A. en BC:l ttC:2 vC:3 TTC: 4 01. or = e 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
The expression of the expected profit can be stated: 
(6-18) E (TT) = 
al a2 a3 a4 
n H. Po A.e B. 1. 1. 1. 
-p T TT.-1/3 1. 
-p v.) 
v 1. 
v. TT. 
1. 1. 
n al (po A.e B. 1. 1. 
1/28 
00 
e -p -DT.-p w 1. v 
a2 a3 a u oi H. v. TT. 4 e 
1. 1. 1. 
whe re p
0 
price of one pound of fish 
P Price of the winch w 
DT depreciation 
fishing 
on boat and motor imputed to trap 
P price of gasoline 
v 
PT price of a trap 
1/3 (p
0 
A enBC:1 ttC: 2 
1. 1. 
labor according 
vC:3 TTC:4 euoi -p v.) 
1. 1. v 1. 
price of 
to the lay system. 
If the expected profit is to be maximized, the first 
orde r condition to invest in an optimum size winch is: 
( 6-19 ) dE (TT) i 
a e = 
p Xl. n 
o i e 
(3/2)e 1/2<1 
00 
Vi 
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or ex-post, 
(6-20) ln p + ln Xl .-ln(3/2)-l/28 + n = ln p + u. 0 l 00 W lO 
For the group of 11 fishermen fishing with winches 
equation (6-18) becomes 
(6-21) 1 11 
from which 
8.005 
e = 1488 
11 
l: 
i=l 
(ln p + ln Xl. - ln(3/2)+1/28 )+n = 8.005 
0 l 00 
This means that as long as the pot hauler costs less 
than $1488, the fishermen who use one are justified in doing 
so. The prices of the pot haulers used by the Puerto Rican 
fishermen were not recorded during the interview. However, 
mechanical pot haulers are available in Puerto Rico at a 
price of less than $500. 
To conclude this chapter it is important to emphasize 
the difference in technical efficiency between the fishermen 
fishing both with traps and hand lines. It should also be 
noted that the captains of the larger, more powerful boats 
are not more technically efficient than the captains of the 
smaller boats. 
Among the fishermen exclusively trap fishermen exclu-
sively trap fishing a sizeable difference in their catch 
was recorded when they use a winch. 
The meaning of the tests of price efficiency should 
also be recalled. They indicate whether the fishermen per-
ceive the prices of the inputs correctly. When it is found 
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that the fishermen invest too much or too little in one 
input it is always given the level of the other inputs. 
In this chapter it was determined, that with that cons-
traint, in general, the fishermen invest too much in 
traps and not enough in boats and motors. This means 
that they perceive the price of the traps as lower than 
it really is and the price of the combination boat-motor 
as higher that it really is. Yet, when maximizing pro-
fit with all levels of inputs variables, it may be found 
that bigger and more powerful boats are needed, and it 
could happen that the number of traps presently owned is 
optimum, for those larger boats. But this would be an 
accident. 
The results of this chapter suggest that the Puerto 
Rican fishermen have a poor idea of the real prices of 
the inputs especially boats and traps they are using. In 
the absence of any other action their returns could be im-
proved if they acquired a better notion of those prices. 
VII SOME POLICY SUGGESTIONS TO INCREASE THE 
INCOME OF THE PUERTO RICAN FISHERMEN 
Chapters V and VI provided a structural and a be-
havioral description of trap and line fishing. From the 
findings of those two chapters, it is possible to suggest 
policies for improving the economic situation of the fish-
ermen. 
Before considering policy alternatives this chapter 
first describes more fully the present economic situation 
of the fishermen, and then develops a model suitable for 
evaluating policy measures. 
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I The Present Economic Performance 
The total value of the annual catch, the return to 
the captain and the crew, and the return on the present 
value of the boat plus motor by various motor sizes and 
equipment types for trap fishermen are given in Table 
VII-1. Similar information for line fishermen is presen-
ted in Table VII-2. 
(7-1) 
1) The total annual catch is measured in dollars TR 
2) The total annual return to the captain, TRC, in-
cludes his profit plus his return on capital and 
on labor and management. It is what he has left 
after he has paid all his fixed and variable 
costs. 
TRC = TR - Depreciation - maintenance - crew's share-
cost of gasoline - cost of the traps (or cost 
of the lines) 
The depreciation in this case is the straight line 
depreciation on the boat, the motor, and the winch. 
3) Annual net income to the captain 
This was computed by subtracting from the total annual 
return the interest the captain pays on his boat and motor. 
An interest of 5 percent was used because it is the cost 
Of capital to the fishermen taking loans from the Puerto 
Rican Department of Agriculture. 
This represents the return to the captain's labor, 
management and profit. 
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4) The annual crew's share CS, is equal to: 
(7-2) CS = 1/3 (TR - cost of gasoline) 
This is the most common way of remunerating the crew, al-
though there are other systems. 
5) The average annual return on the present value of 
the boat and the motor 2 is computed as follows: 
( 7-3) r = TR - D - M - 2 CS - V - T PE+ PB 
TR total revenue 
D depreciation on the boat, the motor, 
M maintenance 
2CS twice the crew's share. In this way 
labor is remunerated as much as his 
v cost of gasoline 
T cost of the traps or the lines 
PE present value of the motor 
PB present value of the boat 
and the winch 
the captain's 
crew's 
In order to compute this return it was necessary to 
arbitrarily assign a value to the captain's labor. By 
deciding to give him the same remuneration as his crew, it 
provided a basis to compare the rate of return r to the 
interest rate the captain has to pay. With this kind of 
imputation if r>5 percent the captain is financially better 
off than his crew, but if r <5 percent the captain would make 
more money being a deckhand provided that there is only one 
deckhand in addition to the captain. Note that the same 
conclusion can be reached by comparing the captain's net 
income to his crew's share. 
If a fisherman is involved in both trap and line fish-
ing, the returns are computed for each activity. The va-
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lues are calculated for each of the activities according to 
the relative contribution to the total revenue. If a fish-
erman derives 10 percent of his total revenue from line 
fishing and 90 percent from trap fishing, when computing 
the return on the boat and motor from line fishing, only 10 
percent of the total depreciation 10 percent of the mainte-
nance, and 10 percent of the sum of the present value of the 
boat and motor are included. 
It appears in Tables VII-1 and VII-2 that the more 
powerful boats yield higher returns and the highest returns 
are obtained when fishing with lines rather than with traps. 
Actually, when fishing with traps, only the boats having a 
motor over 40 HP, and the boats equipped with a winch yield 
positive returns on the _ present value of boat plus motor. 
The boats equipped with an engine between 30 and 40 HP have 
very low returns. In fact in this case, the captain's net 
annual income is only about half of the crew's share. In 
most cases when fishing with traps the net annual income 
of the captain is lower than the crew's share precisely be-
cause of the negative returns on boat and motors. 
When fishing with lines all the returns on boat and 
motor are positive. The difference in the returns on boat 
and motor between lines and traps can be explained by the 
fact that trap fishing requires a higher level of invest-
ment, and this is further accentuated by the fact that 
given the present prices and catch rates the fishermen have 
overinvested in traps. 
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TABLE VII-1 
ECONOMIC RETURNS TO THE TRAP FISHING 
OPERATIONS IN 1972 
Total Total Net Annual Annual 
value annual annual crew's return on 
of return income share the present 
annual to of the value of 
catch captain captains boat and 
motor 
In $ In $ In $ In $ In % 
All traps 5575 1750 1684 1696 -45 
(97 2 6) 1 (3252) (_3216) (2019) (1.4184) 
Traps & lines 9978 4519 4419 3144 -19 
(9987) (52 9 2) (5222) (3178) (2.2892) 
Traps only 4402 1011 954 1310 -52 
(4705) l2013 l l20 00) (14 2 6) (1.1308) 
Motor > 30 HP 10854 3917 3795 3300 -21 
(13756) (4544) (4509) (2521) (1.9614) 
Motor < 30 HP 3139 749 709 956 -56 
(37971 Cl8 09) Cl 7 9 9 l (1198) Cl.1157) 
Motor > 40 HP 14506 6645 6483 4502 87 
(7 58 8) (_4451) (_4 4 3 7 l (2545) Cl. 0508) 
Motor < 40 HP 2662 832 784 1170 -70 
- (3 64 3) (_198 0} Cl9 6 9) (1419) Cl.3439) 
Boats with a 10365 3943 3830 3229 2 
winch (8 5 7 7) (4755) (4711) (27 05) (1.3721) 
Boats without 3571 845 799 1057 -63 
a winch (_4073) (1833) (_18 21) (124 0) (1. 37 21) 
30 HP < motor 7203 1189 1108 2098 -242 
< 40 HP (6923) (_2 7 8 4) (277 5) (2 010) Cl. 28 06) 
Source: Field Survey of 39 fishermen, 1973-74 and Department 
of Agriculture sale tickets for the period. 
1 The numbers in parenthesis are the standard error 
of the variables in their respective samples. 
All lines 
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TABLE VII-2 
ECONOMIC RETURNS TO THE LINE FISHING 
OPERATIONS IN 1972 
Total Total Net 
value annual annual 
of return income 
annual to of the 
catch captain captains 
In $ 
1550 
(1367)1 
In $ 
471 
(818) 
In $ 
4 51 
(813) 
Annual Annual 
crew's return on 
share the present 
In $ 
355 
( 4 24) 
value of 
boat and 
motor 
In % 
30 
(1.5281) 
Trap s & lines 7 29 
(7 29) 
123 
(62 9) 
118 
(623) 
114 
(3 2 6) 
15 
(1.7864) 
Lines only 
Motor > 3 0 HP 
Motor < 30 HP 
Motor > 40 HP 
Motor < 40 HP 
2212 
(1415) 
1045 
(8 01) 
1718 
(14 94 l 
1118 
(9 05) 
1658 
(14 63) 
627 
(1038) 
471 
(445) 
471 
(9 22) 
514 
(_5 0 2 l 
460 
(8 9 2) 
599 
(1036) 
458 
( 4 3 6) 
449 
(918) 
503 
( 49 0) 
438 
(8 8 8) 
477 
(514) 
311 
(254) 
369 
(4 7 5) 
327 
(281) 
362 
(4 60) 
52 
(1.3372) 
101 
(0.8871) 
7 
(1.6452 
123 
(0.8460) 
7 
(1.5895) 
Source : Field Survey of 20 fishermen, 1973-74 and Depart-
ment of Agriculture sale tickets for the period. 
1 The number in parenthesis is the standard error 
of the variables in their respective samples. 
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TABLE VII-3 
ECONOMIC RETURNS TO THE FISHERMEN USING 
BOTH TRAPS AND LINES IN 1972 
Annual Catch 
Total annual returns to 
the captain 
Annual net income to the 
captain: 
Annual crew's share: 
Annual return on present 
value of the boat and 
motor 
$10707 
$4633 
$4548 
$3259 
-18.1 percent 
Source: Field survey of 9 fishermen, 1973-74 and Department 
of Agriculture's Sale Tickets for the same period. 
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II Use of the Model for Policy Development 
In Chapter V and Chapter VI the estimated catch func-
tions were given as: 
Q a u oi q (7-5) x 
oi = A IT x qi e q=l 
In Chapter IV however, it was shown that the full 
expression of equation (7-5) was 
(7-6) 1 x {N* 
oi = -b 
Q 
K M IT 
q=l 
a 
x 9 qi e 
n Q a u 
oi } E (K M IT x q qi e 
i=l q=l 
u . Ol 
When estimating the catch functions at a single point 
in time A was a constant. For the purpose of policy de-
velopment it is not acceptable treatment of A. Diffi-
culties arise since it is not possible given present know-
ledge of fish population dynamic to estimate the components 
of A. Neither N*, the maximum level that the population 
could reach naturally, the coefficient b, nor the effects 
of crowding externalities embodies in M are known. 
Nevertheless, one important observation can be made 
concerning the relationship expressed by equation (7-6) 
which is useful for better estimating the effects of given 
policies: if A is not a constant any increase (decrease) 
in the fishing power of the firms will have less (more) 
effect on the catch than if A is treated as a constant. 
163 
1) Change in the fishing power which does not effect 
M directly. 
If the fishermen's skill improves there will be no 
direct effect on the crowding externalities. However, the 
catch will not increase by as much as it would if A were 
a constant. The reason 
. 1 pressure increases, b 
for this is 
n Q 
L: (K M II 
i=l q=l 
that 
Ct q 
X . e qi 
as the fishing 
u . 
oi) will also 
increase and this will lower A. Even in this case it is 
possible that the economic position of the fishermen im-
proves. If this is so it is likely that new fishermen 
will enter the fisheries which would directly affect M 
through the crowding externalities, further reducing the 
catch. 
2) Change in fishing power which affect M directly. 
This could happen if either the number of boats or 
the number of traps were increased or if the fishermen went 
to sea more often. In this eventuality similar adjustments 
as described above would take place. 
Because it is difficult to forecast exactly the effects 
of a policy decision, the findings presented in the follo-
wing section serve only as an indication of the direction in 
which the changes can be expected to occur. In the absence 
of better information on N*, b, and M, caution will be 
necessary when formulating policy. For instance, a size 
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boat which would maximize profit if A were constant may 
be too large because of the cumulative effects of all the 
n Q 
fishermen on stocks (through increase in E (K M TI 
a 
X 9 e qi 
i=l q=l 
However, keeping those caveats in mind, it 
is possible to suggest some policy directions for impro-
ving the economic situation of the Puerto Rican fishermen. 
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III Policy Direction: Increasing technical 
efficiency for the trap fishermen 
For trap fishing it is possible to suggest some limi-
ted measures which would increase profit. In addition, 
one can make recommendations in order to attempt to maxi-
rnize profit, which apply to line fishing as well. 
In Chapter VI it was shown that the fishermen fishing 
also with lines caught on the average 77 percent more fish 
in their traps than the fishermen fishing with traps alone. 
In addition, the fishermen who owned a winch caught 61 per-
cent more fish. When both factors were combined their in-
dividual effect was reduced but it was still significant. 
Equation (6-3) gave: 
L{E(PRl)} = 
-1. 285 + 
(1.126) 
(-1.140) 
0.395 Q + 0.274 W + 0.793 LB+ 
(0.206) (0.198) (0.428) 
(1.916) (1.384) (1.852) 
-0.077 LV + 
(0.055) 
(-1.399) 
0.332 LTT+ ~(0.473) 2 
(0.139) 
(2.394) 
L{E(PRl)} natural logarithm of the expected value of the 
total revenue from traps. 
Q = 
Q = 
w = 
w = 
The 
LB = 
LH = 
LV = 
LTT = 
1 if 
0 if 
1 if 
0 if 
the fishermen fishes with traps and lines 
the fisherman fishes with traps only 
the boat is equipped with a winch 
the boat is not equipped with a winch 
other variables are the natural logarithm of 
length of the boat 
number of man days at sea 
number of gallons of gasoline used in a year 
number of traps owned 
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(0.4738) being the standard error of the regression. 
1/2(0.4738) 2 is the correcting term necessary to ob-
tain the expected value L{E(PRl) }. 
This suggests two actions which could be taken to 
improve the income of the trap fishermen. First is to 
train the fishermen in order to improve their knowledge 
of the fish behavior and second to equip all the boats 
with a winch. 
Some notions of the effects of these actions, under 
the assumption of A constant (no stock externality) can be 
seen from the following analysis. 
The expected value of the total revenue from trap fish-
ing is expressed by equation (7-7). Equation (6-3) would 
become: 
(7-7) L{E(PRl)} = -0.615 + 0.793 LB+ 1.190 LH -0.077 LV+ 
(0.257) (0.428) (0.156) (0.055) 
(-2.439) (1.852) (7.622) (-1.399) 
0.332 LT+ ~(0.473) 2 
(0.139) 
(2.394) 
The data in Table VII-4 gives some indication of the 
average effect on the value of the catch and the returns if 
equation (7-7) was the actual catch function. Since the 
returns to the captain are what remains from total revenue 
after payment for all variable and fixed inputs they are a 
good measure of the fishermen's performance. For this rea-
son the percentage increase in return to the captain, as 
shown in the last column of Table VII-4, is a good indica-
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TABLE VII-4 
POTENTIAL RETURNS TO THE TRAP FISHERMEN AFTER 
ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND USING BOATS EQUIPPED 
WITH A WINCH 
All traps 
Trap s and lines 
Traps only 
Motor > 30 HP 
Motor < 3 0 HP 
-
Motor > 40 HP 
Motor 
.s. 40 HP 
Boats with a 
winc h 
Boats without 
a winch 
Total 
value of 
annual 
catch 
In $ 
9120 
(9106) 1 
13405 
(13297) 
7977 
(7530) 
15984 
(9282) 
5952 
(_7191) 
21752 
(_6886) 
67 51 
(_7392) 
13947 
(_l 0 913) 
7036 
(7 5 2 0) 
Total 
annual 
return to 
captain 
In $ 
4077 
(5018) 
6779 
(7498) 
3357 
(4001) 
7315 
C5568) 
2582 
(4034) 
11467 
(39 24) 
2691 
(_3 8 7 3) 
6331 
(_6295) 
3107 
(_4123) 
Net 
annual 
income 
of the 
captain 
In $ 
4011 
(4982) 
6779 
(_7421) 
3300 
(3986) 
7194 
(5527) 
2542 
(4024) 
11305 
(_3932) 
2644 
(38 61) 
6218 
(6240) 
3061 
(4108) 
1 
The nu mber in parenthesis is the standard error of the 
variables in their respective samples. 
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TABLE VII-4 (continued) 
POTENTIAL RETURNS TO THE TRAP FISHERMEN AFTER 
ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND USING BOATS EQUIPPED 
WITH A WINCH 
Annual Annual % Change 
crew's return in captain's 
share on the return from 
present present 
value of situation 
boat and 
motor 
In $ In % 
All traps 2878 47 133 
l28 98 l l2. 2 21) 
Traps & lines 4287 16 50 
l4275l C3 .19 o l _ 
Trap s only 2502 56 232 
l23 69 l ll. 951) 
Motor > 30 HP 5010 55 87 
(2 9 63) (2.672) 
Motor < 30 HP 1894 44 244 
(2319) (2.039) 
Motor > 4 0 HP 6918 202 73 
(2264 )_ Cl. 52 9) 
Motor < 4 0 HP 2120 18 224 
(38731 (2.227) 
Boats with a 4424 81 61 
win c h (34841 Cl.7141 
Boa ts without 2212 35 161 
a winch (23831 (2 . 3 7 0 l 
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tion of the magnitude of change which could be expected: 
These are calculated as: 
(7-8) Potential Returns - Actual Returns x 100 
Actual Returns 
The values given in Table VII-4 must be interpreted 
with caution. They indicate only very roughly the level 
which might be reached if the actions suggested above 
were taken. In addition, since the assumption regarding 
A as a constant may not be fully satisfied, the computa-
tion itself adds to the need for a careful interpretation 
of the results. This is partly reflected in the relatively 
large standard deviations of the estimates. Despite these 
limitations, if all the fishermen had the skill of the 
fishermen who fish with lines and traps, and if all the 
boats were equipped with a winch, it is clear that econo-
mic performance would be increased. This is demonstrated 
by the estimates of the annual returns on the boat and the 
motor given in Table VII-4 which are all positive, while, 
in most cases, today they are negative. Not surprisingly, 
the biggest improvement is possible for the small boats. 
Today few of them are equipped with a winch and most of 
their owners fish only with traps. As expected, the small-
est changes are for the boats which are already equipped 
with a winch or for fishermen who currently fish with both 
traps and lines. 
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IV Policy Directions for Both Trap s and Lines Fishermen 
I Improving price efficiency when investing in 
traps. 
In Section II of Chapter VI it was shown that, in 
general, fishermen had a tendency to underestimate the 
price of the traps although it was pointed out this 
varied considerable between groups. 
If the number of traps owned by the fishermen were 
adapted to their actual needs, returns could also be 
increased. In order to demonstrate some of the effects 
which could be expected from such a measure, the optimum 
number of traps was computed for each fisherman given 
his present level of the other inputs: boat, moto~ pre-
sence of a winch, and number of men days at sea. Equation 
(7-9) was obtained by maximizing profit for the number of 
traps, keeping all other input levels constant. 
(7-9) L{E(TT)} = 1 {ln(0 .332) - 1.285 + 0.395 Q 1 - o.332 
+0.274 W+0.793 LB+l.190 LH - 0.077 LV - ln(20)-ln(3/2)+ 
~(0.473) 2 } 
L{E(TT) } natural logarithm of the expected value of the 
optimum number of traps given the present level 
of the other inputs. 
0.332 coefficient of the natural logarithm of the trap 
factor in equation (7-7). 
All the other coefficients are also from equation (7-7). 
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Q = 1 if the fisherman fishes with traps and lines 
Q = 0 if the fisherman fishes with traps only 
w 1 if the boat is equipped with a winch 
w = 0 if the boat is not equipped with a winch 
The other symbols are the natural logarithms of: 
LB length of the boat 
LH number of man days at sea in a year 
LV number of gallons of gasoline used in 
20 expected price of a trap 
-ln(3/2) is a term which already appeared 
price efficiency and which stems from 
a year 
when testing for 
the existence of 
the lay system 
1/2(0.473)2 1/28 
00 
is the correcting term to obtain the 
logarithm of the expected value of the 
optimum number of traps. 
L{E(TT)} was first computed for each fisherman. Then 
the natural logarithm of the expected value of the return 
from traps was determined for each of them using equation 
(7-10) 
(7-10) L{E(PRl)} = 1.285 + 0.395 Q + 0.274 W+0.793 LB+ 
1.190 LH - 0.077 LV + 0.332 L{E(TT)}+ 1/2(0.473) 2 
From the value of L{E(PRl)} obtained for each fisher-
men E(PRl) was computed. This allows calculation of the 
measures used previously to estimate the performance of 
the fishermen. The average of those estimates for the 
different groups are presented in Table VII-4. In addition, 
the geometric means of the optimum number of traps are 
given for each group. This allows a comparison with the 
results of the test for price efficiency given in Chapter 
VI. 
For comparative purposes the percentage change in 
return to the captain resulting from optimal investment 
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in traps was also computed. 
Table VII-5 shows that some substantial improvements 
would be obtained if the fishermen used the proper number 
of traps. Although the potential changes in returns are 
not as great as from increasing skill and using winches, 
it appears that helping the fishermen to choose the correct 
number of traps would increase their returns from fishing. 
To that effect, equation (7-9) could be used as a guide. 
Many factors specific to each fisherman will affect the 
optimum number of traps he can handle. In most cases, how-
ever, substantial deviation from the estimate obtained from 
equation (7-9) should be corrected. 
II Maximizing Profit 
In order to maximize profit fishermen must not only 
choose the optimum level of variable inputs but they must 
also operate an optimum size boat. Practically this corres-
ponds to two different types of decisions. In one case the 
fisherman will consider his boat as a constraint and he will 
want to invest in the number of traps which maximizes his 
profit given his present boat. In the second case, at other 
time, he will want to change boat and choose one which will 
maximize his profit, given some of his firm's characteristics 
like the number of days he goes at sea. It is this kind of 
situation which is discussed here. The decision process for 
this choice is ihe same for trap fishing and hand line fish-
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TABLE VII-5 
POTENTIAL RETURNS TO THE TRAP FISHEffivlEN PROVIDED 
THAT THEY USED THE OPTIMUM NUMBER OF TRAPS GIVEN 
THE PRESENT LEVEL OF THE OTHER INPUTS 
Total Total Net Annual 
value of annual annual crew's 
annual return to income share 
catch captain of the 
captain 
In $ In $ In $ In $ 
All t r aps 8450 2944 2878 2654 
(13746) (.57 3 6) (.59 69) (4485) 
Traps & lines 22725 9126 9026 7393 
' (.24109) (10119} (10031) \ (7880) 
' Traps o nly 4643 1396 1239 \ 1390 
(_54 3 9) (1989} (1977) CJ..684 
Motor > 30 HP 19668 7217 7 096 6238 
(1944 0) (8505) (8 4 64) (6435) 
Motor < 30 HP 3272 97 2 932 1000 
(_5008} (2 013} (2 006) (15 9 61\) 
Motor > 40 HP 33448 13429 13268 10816 
(_18 5 3 3) CB O 5 6) (80361 (617 4) 
Motor < 4 0 HP 37 62 978 ., 930 1124 
(514 9} (1880) (18 7 3) (1599) 
Boats with a 19349 7340 7226 6224 
winc h C209881 (8 9 6 6) (8914) (6885) 
' 
Boa ts without 3957 1143 1097 1186 
.. 
a winc h (52 6 9} l2 059} (2051 }_ (164 7) 
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TABLE VII - 5 (continued) 
POTEN'I'IAL RETURNS TO THE TRAP FISHERMEN PROVIDED 
THAT THEY USED THE OPTIMUM NUMB~l3,, OF TRAPS GIVEN 
THE PRESENT LEVEL OF THK ::o7'HER INPUTS 
Ai l t r a ps 
Trap s & lines 
Tra'p s only 
' Motor > 3 0 HP 
! 
Motor < 3 0 HP 
Motot > 40 HP 
Motor • < 40 HP 
Boats with a 
winch 
Boats without 
*Geometric means 
Annual 
return 
on the 
present 
value of 
boat and 
motor 
In % 
4 
(0 . 7818) 
60 
(1. 2 82 2) 
-10 
(0 . 5215 
38 
Cl.1411) 
-11 
(_0.5010) 
111 
(l . 1272) 
-15 
(_0.50961 
39 
(_l. 18 9 7) 
9 
(0 . 4940) 
% change 
in 
captain's 
return 
68 
102 
28 
84 
30 
102 
18 
86 
35 
present* 
number 
of 
traps 
42.l 
43.2 
41. 9 
69 . 3 
33.5 
7 5. 7 
36.8 
62.7 
35.4 
optimum* 
number 
of 
traps 
24.6 
39.8 
21.6 
82.0 
14.0 
305 
15.3 
80.7 
15 . 4 
The number in parenthesis is the standard error of the 
variables in their respective samples. 
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ing, and therefore the following discussion applies equally 
to both methods. 
When investing in a boat and a motor the fishermen 
usually have to choose between boat types already built 
and available at a given price. For this reason, it is 
more useful to provide the fishermen with an equation 
which would allow them to decide if a given combination 
of boat and motor is optimum for their operation. A de-
mand equation would give the size of the theoretically 
optimum boat. Since the cost is not a linear function of 
the number of feet of length, nor of the number of horse-
power , this would not provide sufficient information for 
decision making. On the other hand, a guide by which to 
judge given combination of boat and motor is more practi-
cal. 
Consider the equation of the expected profit. 
where 
p0 price of the fish 
A constant 
B length of the boat (as a measured of the combined 
input boat and motor) 
H number of man days at sea in a year 
T number of traps owned 
V number of gallons of gasoline used during a year 
D annual cost of the boat (depreciation on the boat 
and the motor and mainte-
nance) 
~ share under the lay system given to the crew 
00 
176 
pT price of a trap 
pv price of a gallon of gasoline 
Assuming that H is given, taking the first order con-
ditions, a boat is of optimum size if 
(7-12) ln{E(D)} = 1 
where a. = lna. 
l l 
If ln D is larger than the right hand side of the equation 
the boat would be an over-investment; if ln D is smaller 
it would be an under-investment. 
If the boat was to be used in more than one activity 
lnD should be replaced by lnD+lnZ, where Z would be the 
share of the activity studied in the total revenue. 
Here too, it is necessary to recall the previous 
notes of caution, that because of the effect of externali-
ties these equations should only be considered as a guide. 
In addition, in this study none of the boats were equipped 
with echo sounders, radar, nor radio, all of which might 
increase the productivity of a given boat. To decide if 
it is judicious to invest in a boat equipped with such 
aids, simply by using equation (7-12) there could be 
erroneous results. 
It was shown earlier that the fishermen underinvested 
in their boats, and that large boats with inboard motors 
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were more profitable. Despite these findings, before un-
dertaking any government program to increase boat size, it 
must be kept in mind that large boats require more harbor 
facilities, and these represent an added cost to the pro-
graM. In the present study they are not. 
Using the coefficients of equation (6-3), equation 
(7-12) becomes: 
(7-13) ln{E(D)} = 1 o. 7442 {lnp0 -0.9379 + 0.3958 Q + 
0.2743 W + 0.7938 LB + 1.1903 LH - 0.771 
(-2.5770 - lnpT) + 0.3329 (1.10110-lnpv)} 
Equation (7-13) can be used to test if a boat of a 
certain size B with an annual depreciation of D will be an 
optimum investment, provided the number of man days at sea 
is H and p
0 
is the average price of a pound of fish, pT the 
price of a traps, and p the price of a gallon of gasoline. 
v 
If the captain displays a skill comparable to those 
who fish with both traps and lines or if he, himself+ 
fishes with traps and lines Q = 1, otherwise Q = Q. 
If the boat is equipped with a winch W = 1, other-
wise W = O. 
Before closing this part of the section one important 
note must be added. It appeared in Chapter VI that the 
catch increased with the size and the power of the boats 
presumably because the larger, more powerful boats allow 
the captains to fish at the edge of the continental shelf. 
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The sub samples of powerful boats, however, were small; 
there were only six boats over 30 HP., and four over 40 
HP., all of the latter from Puerto Real. Suggesting that 
more powerful boats will catch more fish implies that the 
difference of productivity between the edge of the con-
tinental shelf and the closer fishing grounds is every-
where as significant as in Puerto Real. There is present-
ly insufficient data to prove such an assumption. However, 
the exploratory fishing and gear tests which have been 
conducted off Puerto Rico suggest that the edge of the con-
tinental shelf is always more productive than the on-shore 
1 grounds. 
III Chasing between trap fishing and line fishing 
Comparing the information in Table VII-1 and Table 
VII-2 it appears that, presently, line fishing gives the 
higher return on the boat and the motor. It should be 
remembered however, that various measures could be taken 
to improve the returns from both activities and particu-
larly from trap fishing. Consequently, it is difficult 
to compare the potential returns from each activity and to 
make recommendations as to the optimum combination be-
tween trap fishing and line fishing. 
Despite those limitations, some remarks can be made 
1E d ' ' . sta o Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico. A Report on Ex-
ploratory Fishing and Gear Tests in Puerto Rico From 1969 
to 1972 by Rolf Juhl. 
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concerning a profitable combination. In some areas the 
choice must be limited because of the geographical condi-
tions, but from many ports it is possible to fish with 
traps and lines. If the fishermen had the proper training 
more could fish with lines. For the fishermen who fish 
only a few days a month it is certainly a more profitable 
method than trap fishing because of the lower level of 
investment required. 
For the fishermen who fish more regularly, the pre-
sent combination displayed by the more powerful boats seem 
to be quite profitable as the returns in Table VII-1, Table 
VII-2 and Table VII-3 show. 
Whatever the potential returns this model could exhi-
bit for both activities, it would be unwise to give up com-
pletely one method for the other. In the present model the 
fish population has been treated as homogeneous, but in 
Chapter II it was shown that the catch from lines did not 
have the same species composition as the catch from traps. 
Abandoning one method for the other, or even changing dras-
tically the balance, would affect the fish population in 
a way that would make the assumption of the model unaccep-
table and therefore would render the conclusions inaccurate. 
Despite the various limitations due to the analytical 
framework, or to the lack of information, this chapter 
shows that many measures could be undertaken which would 
improve the economic conditions of the Puerto Rican fisher-
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men. Not all those measures would require higher invest-
ment. The effects of a higher fishing skill would, for 
instance be very significant. 
Another measure which would have important financial 
consequences for the fishermen concerns the price and the 
life of the traps. In Table VII-1 it was shown that in 
1972 the average annual return to the captains fishing 
with traps was $1750 while they owned an average of 44.2 
traps (Table II-7). It is clear that if the price of the 
traps could be reduced or their life lengthened it would 
affect condiserably the captain's returns. 
In addition, it should also be recalled that the num-
ber of days the fishermen go to sea is an important element 
in the selection of the other inputs. If the fishermen went 
to sea more often, larger, more powerful boats would be jus-
tified. 
Finally it is important to emphasize that the results 
of this chapter indicated the direction of the changes which 
can be expected if some policies are implemented. They 
should not be taken to represent exact magnitudes of those 
changes. 
CONCLUSION 
This study should only be considered as the first 
step of an economic analysis of the Puerto Rican artisa-
nal fishery. Much more research remains to be done. This 
survey however, revealed some important facts concerning 
the two most important fishing methods: trap fishing and 
hand line. Although many of the results are not surprising 
retrospectively, their confirmation provides the decision 
makers with firm grounds on which to base their policy. 
It was shown that it was possible to estimate catch 
functions with a good level of precision. Not surprising-
ly, the size and power of the boats turned out to be an 
important element to explain the level of the catch. Where 
trap fishing ·was concerned, the number of traps owned by 
the fishermen and the number of men aboard were also signi-
ficant factors to explain the catch. For line fishing no 
other input was found to have a significant influence on 
the catch. Comparing the regressions for catch from trap 
fishing and catch from line fishing it appeared that the 
former ones had higher R21 s and F statistics suggesting the 
possibility that some input more important for line fish-
ing than for trap fishing had been omitted from the equa-
tions. The tests of technical efficiency revealed that 
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fishing skill might be such an input, since they showed 
that line fishermen were, as a whole, more skillful than 
trap fishermen. 
The tests of price efficiency showed that the fisher-
men were not price efficient. They indicated that some-
what larger boats than the ones presently used would be 
more profitable. Concerning the optimum number of traps, 
the tests also revealed that some fishermen underestimated 
it while others overestimated it, depending upon the size 
of their fishing operations. 
The results of their tests led to policy recommenda-
tions. Two kinds of measures should be taken. It was de-
monstrated that improving the fishing skill of the fisher-
men and generalizing the use of a winch for trap fishermen 
would considerably increase the catch. 
At the same time, helping the fishermen choose the 
optimum number of traps and the optimum size boats would 
improve their profits. 
All those results are important to anyone interested 
in the development of the Puerto Rican fishery much more 
remains to be done however, if a comprehensive management 
program is to be drawn. 
Many more studies could be undertaken to improve the 
present one in order to provide information on economic 
aspects which have been ignored here. 
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For instance, it was not possible to evaluate with 
precision the effects of the policy measures suggested by 
the present analysis. This was due to the lack of know-
ledge concerning the level and actual growth function of 
the fish population and the crowding externalities, since 
it is difficult to design a management program without 
some knowledge of the fish population. 
In addition, it is essential to know what the factors 
are which motivate entrance into the fishing industry. Pro-
fit is probably an important one, but the policy maker must 
know the effect his decisions will have on the number of 
persons who will enter into fishing. This will require 
analyzing the role of other factors outside fishery such 
as the general level of employment or the demand for la-
bor from the agricultural sector. In this study, the num-
ber of days at sea was assumed constant. In fact, it is 
likely that an increase in the profit will encourage the 
fishermen to fish more often and this will lead to an in-
crease in the catch. The policy maker should be aware of 
that effect. 
Finally, no global management scheme for fishery was 
proposed. This should, in the future, be an important area 
of research. The analysis of fish marketing in Puerto Rico 
could also suggest important decisions to develop fishery. 
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Much is still unknown of the economics of the Puerto 
Rican fishery. The points mentioned above are but a few 
of the possible areas of research, and the results of the 
present survey should encourage further study. 
APPENDIX I: Data Collection and Field Method 
The data used in the present study can be classified 
in two categories according to their sources. The catch 
figures were obtained from the Puerto Rican Department of 
Agriculture, which gathers these statistics from sale 
tickets recorded on a fishing trip basis throughout the 
year. On the other hand the information concerning the 
type and quantity of inputs used by the fishermen were 
obtained through direct interviews. 
An important point needs to be emphasized. 'I'he pur-
pose of this study being to analyze some of the production 
processes in the fisheries rather than the economic situa-
tion of all the fishermen, it was decided to interview only 
the captains of the boats in order to avoid including twice 
the same firm in the sample. (In the following the word 
"fishermen" will refer to the captains unless otherwise 
specified) . 
The Commercial Fisheries Laboratory of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture keeps lists of all the fishermen in 
Puerto Rico. The sample for Cabo Rojo was built by 
choosing every third name on those lists. Since the lists 
were not set up in any particular order, this method was 
in fact systematic random sampling. However, it appeared 
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that some of the fishermen selected in that fashion did 
not report their catch to the Department of Agriculture. 
Although, in the questionnaire, all the fishermen were 
asked to estimate the value of their catch, those esti-
mates turned out to be quite different from the catch 
reported to the government. This suggested that the 
answer to that part of the questionnaire might not be 
highly reliable. 
The answers given in the questionnaires were con-
stantly understated, they averaged $3693 against $6321 
on the sale tickets for the same fishermen. At the same 
time the smaller standard error (1432) instead of (6270) 
suggests that in the survey, the fishermen with the high-
est revenues tended to lower them to what they perceived 
as closer to the community's average. 
Consequently, if systematic random sampling was 
used and if one was to discard the information given by 
the fishermen who did not report their catch .:to the govern-
ment, this could have reduced considerably the size of the 
actual sample. For that reason, it was decided to inter-
view, in the selected communities, all the fishermen for 
whom the government had catch figures and to limit the 
study to those fishermen. 
A priori this method could have introduced a bias, 
but, as it will be shown later, it is likely to be ne-
gligible since often the fact that his catch is recorded 
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or not is independent of the fishermen. This means the 
recorded catches are not systematically the highest or 
the lowest ones. For all pratical purposes, it is possible 
that whether a catch is reported or not may be a random 
process. For that reason it was thought that the risk 
of introducing a slight bias was more than compensated for 
by the fact that the information obtained in that fashion 
was more reliable. 
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I The Sale Tickets 
Since 1968 the Commercial Fisheries Laboratory of the 
Puerto Rican Department of Agriculture has been gathering 
statistics on the fisheries. 1 Under this program, the 
Laboratory continuously keeps up to date a list of all the 
fishermen of Puerto Rico. In addition, the catches are 
reported using sale tickets. Every time a fishermen goes 
at sea, a sale ticket is filled out, either by the fisher-
man himself or, more often, by the dealer who bought the 
fish. The slip is supposed to record the total catch in 
weight and value. In addition, it gives a breakdown of 
the catch per species in weight and value and it indicates 
the fishing method used to catch the fish. 
Of all the informations given on the sale tickets the 
breakdown by species is the least reliable. The reason is 
that, in reality, many sale tickets are not filled out 
completely and, more often than not, only report the total 
catch. In addition, sometimes the fish are classified in 
three groups according to their price per pound rather than 
by species. From that information the staff of the Labora-
tory divide the catch among the various species, according 
to past experience. 
In 1968 and 1969 the Department of Agriculture's pro-
jectattempted to collect sale tickets from all the Puerto 
1This project is conducted under the PL 88-309 Fishery 
Research and Development Program. 
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Rican fishermen. This turned out to be a very difficult 
task. From 1970 on, the collection of sale tickets was 
limited to the larger fishing communities. It has been 
estimated that those communities are responsible for 80 
percent of the catch in Puerto Rico. 
If a sale ticket was in fact available every time 
a fisherman of those communities went to sea, it would 
provide not only an accurate estimate of the annual catch, 
but it would also indicate how many days a fisherman goes 
fishing in a year. Sometimes the sale tickets are not 
filled out, however; at other times the agents of the 
laboratory fail to collect them. Given these possible 
mishaps, it is thought that the sale tickets are available 
for only 75 percent of the fishing trips. 2 
The limits of the sale tickets project suggest that 
one must be careful when inferring annual figures or island-
wide estimates from the information collected in that 
fashion. However, it seems that the sale tickets give good 
estimates of the average daily catch. This was confirmed 
by personal observation of the way the tickets were filled 
out by some of the dealers when the fishermen come back 
from a fishing trip. 
2This is according to Dr. Suarez-Caabro Director of the 
Commercial Fisheries Laboratory in Guanajibo, Puerto-Rico. 
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II The Questionnaire 
Personal interviews of the fishermen constitute the 
second source of information for this study. A question-
naire was used to conduct the interviews. Before devising 
it, however, several fishing communities were visited and 
informal conversations with the fishermen took place. 
Then, a first draft was designed and translated into 
Spanish by the Staff of the Laboratory. With the help 
of an employee of the Laboratory the first questionnaire 
was field tested in Mayaguez. This port was chosen for 
pre-testing the questionnaires because it is not very 
different from the type of community in which this survey 
was to be applied. Following this test, the questionnaire 
was revised with the help of the staff of the Laboratory 
and 41 interviews were then conducted in Cabo Rojo during 
a first stay in Puerto Rico. During a second stay other 
interviews were conducted in other communities around the 
island. 
The interviews were all conducted with the help of 
an interpreter. The fishermen were usually cooperative. 
Out of 70 fishermen contacted only two refused to answer. 
The survey dealt with the fishing in 1972, but since the 
interviews were conducted at first during the summer of 
1973, and then during the winter of 1974, 19 of the fish-
ermen who were listed in 1972 were not fishing anymore. 
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Some had taken other jobs; others had moved to the con-
tinental United States. In general, there is no reason 
to doubt the reliability of the answers given by the 
fishermen except, as mentioned earlier, when they were 
asked to evaluate the value of their annual catch. 
All the answers concerning the equipment owned or 
used are highly reliable. Most of the time the inter-
views were conducted on the beach and often it was possi-
ble to observe directly that the information provided by 
the fishermen was correct. 
During the first stay in Puerto Rico, the study was 
intended to address itself more specifically to the way 
the fishermen allocated their resources between various 
economic activities. For this reason the year had been 
divided into three periods and to some of the questions 
the fishermen were expected to give an answer for each 
period of the year. This was the case for the number of 
days at sea for example. After analyzing the results of 
the first part of the survey, when it appeared that few 
fishermen had other economic activities, it was decided 
to ignore this aspect of the problem. Consequently, 
during the second set of interviews the fishermen were 
asked to give only one aggregate answer for the whole 
year 1972. 
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